THE  WAR  AND  THE 
COMING  PEACE 

THE  MORAL  ISSUE 


By  MORRIS  J  AST  ROW,  Jr.,  Ph.D.,LL.D. 
The  War  and  The  Bagdad  Railway 

THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  AND  ITS   RELATION  TO 
THE  PRESENT  CONFLICT. 

14  Illustrations  and  a  Map.  $1.50  Net. 

Boston  Transcript:  "Of  all  the  books  that  have 
come  to  our  notice,  works  dealing  primarily  with 
the  problems  of  Bagdad,  Professor  Morris  Jas- 
trow's  'The  War  and  the  Bagdad  Railway,'  with 
its  illustrative  map,  is  unquestionably  the  best." 

The  New  Republic:  "  Hard  to  match  for  brev- 
ity and  clearness.  As  an  Oriental  scholar,  Pro- 
fessor Jastrow  is  singularly  well  equipped  to  set 
forth  in  the  light  of  history  the  conditions  that 
have  made  Asia  Minor  such  a  disastrous  breeder 
of  strife,  and  this  is,  in  fact,  his  most  interesting 
contribution." 

The  Civilization  of  Babylonia  and 
Assyria 

ITS     REMAINS,     LANGUAGE,     HISTORY,     RELIGION, 
COMMERCE,  LAW,  ART  AND  LITERATURE. 

With  Map  and  164  Illustrations. 
Octavo.  Gilt  Top.  In  a  box  $7.00  Net. 

Art  and  Archaeology :  "This  magnificent  book 
gives  a  comprehensive  and  complete  survey  of  the 
whole  civilization  of  the  ancient  peoples,  who 
dwelt  in  the  Tigro-Eupbrates  Valley.  It  is  writ- 
ten by  one  of  the  foremost  Semitic  scholars  of  the 
world,  and  supersedes  all  works  upon  the  subject. 
Written  in  the  author'6  characteristic  lucid  style, 
it  is  sumptuously  illustrated,  and  is  a  beautiful 
specimen  of  bookmaking." 


THE  WAR  AND  THE 
COMING  PEACE 

THE  MORAL  ISSUE 


BT 

MORRIS  JASTROW,  Jr.,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 

AUTHOR  OF  "THE  WAR  AND   THE   BAGDAD  RAILWAY,"  "THE  CIVILIZATION 
OF  BABYLONIA  AND  ASSYRIA,"   ETC.,   ETC. 


"This  is  the  consolation  on  which  we  rest  in  the 
darkness  of  the  future  and  in  the  conflicts  of 
today,  that  the  government  of  the  world  is  moral 
and  does  forever  destroy  what  is  not." 

— Emerson. 


PHILADELPHIA  AND  LONDON 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

1918 


335* 


COPYRIGHT,   IQl8,   BY  J.   B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 


PUBLISHED  MAY,   ipi8 


lA  •!:: *'. '.'•  '.     :  •* 


PRINTED   BT  J.   B.    LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

AT  THI   WASHINGTON   SQUARE   PBE88 

PHILADELPHIA,   C.  8.  A. 


To 
I.  F.  B. 

AND 

F.H.B. 


381933 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  in  a  measure  an  outgrowth 
of  the  author's  "  The  War  and  the  Bagdad 
Railway."  In  the  latter  work  my  main  pur- 
pose was  to  show  in  the  light  of  history  the 
significance  of  the  region  through  which  the 
Bagdad  Railway  passes,  and  how  by  the 
conversion  of  what  should  have  been  a  purely 
commercial  enterprise  into  an  imperialistic 
project,  backed  by  a  powerful  military  au- 
tocracy, Pan-Germanism  became  a  menace 
to  the  entire  civilized  world.  Underlying 
the  menace,  however,  is  a  moral  issue  which 
was  incidentally  touched  upon  in  the  con- 
cluding chapter  of  the  book.  While  writing 
the  chapter,  I  felt  that  the  larger,  which  are 
also  the  deeper,  aspects  of  the  conflict  sug- 
gested by  the  moral  issue,  merited  a  fuller 
treatment.  I  have,  accordingly,  yielded  to 
the  impulse  to  set  forth  in  greater  detail  cer- 
tain views   in  regard   to  this  vital   issue, 


7 


PREFACE 

reached  as  the  result  of  constant  reading  on 
the  war  and  on  the  problem  of  peace,  and 
which,  I  trust  I  am  justified  in  believing, 
may  be  of  some  value  to  others.  The  main 
theme  that  I  endeavor  to  establish  is  that 
both  the  war  and  the  coming  peace  are  to  be 
viewed  from  the  same  angle — from  the 
point  of  view  of  what  is  shown  to  be  the 
moral  issue.  For  this  reason  the  book  has 
been  divided  into  two  parts,  one  on  the  war 
as  a  moral  issue,  and  the  other  on  the  prob- 
lem of  peace. 

I  have  tried  to  show  that  the  issue  may  be 
summed  up  in  a  single  formula,  to  wit,  that 
we  are  fighting  an  unholy  alliance  between 
power  and  national  ambitions,  and  that  this 
power  is  exerted  in  two  directions — power  as 
the  means  of  carrying  out  national  policies, 
and  power  on  the  part  of  a  military  group, 
headed  by  a  ruler  who  embodies  in  his  per- 
son the  principle  of  autocracy,  as  a  measure 
of  holding  a  nation  in  its  tight  grasp.  These 
two  aspects  of  power,  as  represented  by  the 


PREFACE 

present  German  government,  are  the  two 
sides  of  a  single  shield ;  and  one  of  the  main 
contentions  in  the  unfolding  of  this  theme 
is  to  show  how  Germany's  conduct  of  the 
war,  with  its  revolting  catalogue  of  wrongs 
and  crimes,  as  well  as  its  spy  system  and  in- 
sidious propaganda,  is  the  direct  and  logical 
outcome  of  such  an  alliance  between  national 
ambitions  and  power,  controlled  by  a  group 
whose  necessary  concern  is  its  own  self- 
perpetuation. 

Back  of  Germany's  conduct  of  the  war, 
however,  lies  the  responsibility  for  the  war, 
with  all  the  sufferings  it  has  entailed  on  the 
entire  world.  That,  too,  is  to  be  traced  to 
the  same  unholy  alliance,  and  one  of  my 
aims  in  developing  the  theme  is  to  show  how 
in  the  history  of  mankind  a  moral  issue  al- 
ways ensues,  when  power  or  the  threat  of 
power  is  used  to  force  a  national  policy. 
Even  right,  when  joined  with  might,  leads 
to  an  abuse  of  power  and  to  a  menace, 
against  which  the  world,  in  defense  of  lib- 

9 


PREFACE 

erty  and  civilization,  must  needs  arm  itself. 

In  dealing  with  the  problem  of  peace 
from  the  same  point  of  view,  I  have  been 
careful  to  differentiate  between  terms  of 
peace  and  the  general  question  of  the  kind 
of  peace  which  should  follow  the  triumph 
of  the  moral  issue.  My  concern  is  solely 
with  the  general  question,  for  I  feel  strongly 
that  not  only  is  it  idle  to  discuss  terms  of 
peace  while  the  issue  still  hangs  in  the  bal- 
ance, but  that  this  aspect  of  the  study  must 
be  left  with  those  who  have  been  entrusted 
with  official  authority.  What,  however,  is 
needed,  while  the  conflict  is  still  going  on, 
is  the  clarification  of  public  opinion  as  to 
what  is  meant  by  peace,  and  how  the  peace 
which  the  world  needs  can  be  brought  about. 

It  is  important  that  our  statesmen  and 
diplomatists — and  this  applies  to  other  coun- 
tries as  well  as  to  ours — should  be  guided 
by  public  opinion,  and  this  in  turn  involves 
that  public  opinion  should  become  crystal- 
lized.   It  is  in  the  hope  of  making  a  modest 

10 


PREFACE 

contribution  towards  such  an  end  that  I  have 
tried  to  make  clear  to  myself,  and  then  to 
set  forth  for  others,  the  result  of  constant 
reading  and  thought  on  a  subject  that  has 
already  brought  forth  a  large  number  of 
contributions  from  the  best  minds  in  this 
country,  as  well  as  in  England  and  France. 
Whatever  may  be  the  defects  of  my  discus- 
sion of  the  subject — and  I  lay  no  claim  to 
any  authority  except  that  of  an  earnest  stu- 
dent of  existing  conditions — it  will,  I  trust, 
be  found  to  be  based  on  a  broad  considera- 
tion of  the  theme.  I  am  also  in  hopes  that 
my  main  thought  in  this  connection,  the 
avoidance  of  conditions  which  will  make  it 
possible  in  the  future  for  a  group  in  any 
country,  representing  a  government  instead 
of  representing  a  people,  either  to  deter- 
mine upon  war  or  to  arrange  the  terms  of 
peace,  will  commend  itself  to  my  readers. 

I  confess  to  a  spirit  of  optimism,  though 
there  is  little  in  the  present  situation  to  jus- 
tify it ;  and  I  am  prepared  for  the  criticism 
11 


PREFACE 

that  the  hope  of  disarmament  and  the 
growth  of  internationalism  after  the  war, 
symbolized  by  an  international  parliament 
in  some  form,  is  a  fanciful  dream.  It  may 
be  so.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  one's 
thought  is  directed  towards  reading  the 
signs  of  the  times,  it  must  be  evident,  even 
to  those  who  look  at  the  facts  sternly,  with- 
out the  aid  of  the  imagination,  that  the 
world  has  been  moving  for  some  time  in  the 
direction  of  international  combinations  to 
carry  out  high  endeavors.  This  is  certainly 
true  in  intellectual  and  commercial  fields, 
as  also,  though  to  a  less  degree,  in  the  realm 
of  international  political  relations.  The 
war  itself  in  assembling  nations  of  the  dis- 
tant East  with  those  of  the  West,  to  defend 
the  bulwarks  of  civilization  and  liberty,  is  a 
most  notable  expression  of  the  internation- 
alistic  spirit,  particularly  when  we  bear  in 
mind  that  some  of  these  nations  not  so  very 
long  ago  looked  upon  one  another  as  rivals 

rather  than  as  allies.     The  remarkable  as- 
12 


PREFACE 

pect  of  unity  presented  at  present  by  a  large 
part  of  the  civilized  world  calls  for  an  in- 
terpretation, and  I  feel  that  it  can  have  only 
one  meaning — the  preparation  for  the  next 
step  that  will  lead  the  peoples  of  the  world 
to  a  larger  recognition  of  cooperation  in  an 
international  sense,  as  a  means  both  to 
secure  peace  and  to  promote  the  aims  of 
civilization,  which  can  only  be  carried  out 
through  peace.  Viewed  in  this  light,  the 
creation  of  an  international  parliament  in 
some  form,  upon  the  triumph  of  the  moral 
issue,  would  appear  to  be  not  at  all  of  the 
nature  of  an  idle  dream,  but  a  step  sug- 
gested by  the  logic  of  events,  though  the 
realization  may  not  come  for  some  time.  It 
depends  upon  conditions  at  the  end  of  the 
war,  and  upon  the  rapidity  with  which 
events  may  move  upon  the  termination  of 
the  conflict.  All  that  I  have  in  mind  in 
venturing  to  set  forth  certain  views  is  to 
indicate  the  direction  towards  which  our 
gaze  should  be  turned  when  trying  to  peer 

13 


PREFACE 

into  the  future,  at  present  still  hidden  under 
such  a  thick  veil.  That  veil  will  be  lifted 
when  the  menace  at  present  confronting  the 
world  shall  have  been  removed. 

It  only  remains  for  me  to  express,  as  on 
previous  occasions,  my  sense  of  deep  obliga- 
tion to  my  wife,  who  has  again  given  me  the 
benefit  of  her  judgment  and  criticism  in  the 
reading  of  both  the  manuscript  and  the 
proof.  I  desire  also  gratefully  to  acknowl- 
edge a  number  of  valuable  suggestions  in 
the  treatment  of  the  theme,  made  by  Mr. 
E.  S.  Holloway. 

Morris  Jastrow,  Jr. 

Philadelphia,  April,  1<U8 


14 


CONTENTS 

I 
THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE     ...     17 

II 
THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 93 


"  Politically,  the  young  are  old,  and  only  the 
old  are  young.  The  love  of  liberty,  in  the  English 
sense,  is  to  be  found  in  Germany  only  among  men 
of  the  generation  which,  within  ten  years,  will  have 
disappeared. 

"  And  when  that  time  comes,  Germany  will  lie 
alone,  isolated,  hated  by  neighbouring  countries;  a 
stronghold  of  conservatism  in  the  centre  of  Europe. 
Around  it,  in  Italy,  in  France,  in  Russia  in  the 
North,  there  will  rise  a  generation  imbued  with 
international  ideas  and  eager  to  carry  them  out  in 
life.  But  Germany  will  lie  there,  old  and  half 
stifled  in  her  coat  of  mail,  armed  to  the  teeth  and 
protected  by  all  the  weapons  of  murder  and  defence 
whioh  science  can  invent. 

"  And  there  will  come  great  struggles  and  greater 
wars.  If  Germany  wins,  Europe,  in  comparison 
with  America,  will  politically  be  as  Asia  in  compari- 
son to  Europe.     But  if  Germany  loses,  then    .    .     . 

"  But  it  is  not  seemly  to  play  the  prophet." 
(Written  in  1881.) 

George  Brandes,  The  World  at  War. 


PART  I 

THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 


THE  WAR  AND  THE 
COMING  PEACE 

THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 
I 

There  are  two  ways  of  looking  at  the 
great  conflict.  We  may  have  regard  to  the 
issues  that  lie  at  the  surface,  or  we  may  en- 
deavor to  probe  to  the  deeper  significance 
of  the  war,  for  there  is  always  an  undercur- 
rent to  surface  events.  On  the  surface,  wars 
reveal  race  antagonisms,  religious  dissen- 
sions, political  ambitions  or  economic  rival- 
ries as  the  more  immediate  causes,  but  a 
closer  analysis  will  generally  show  an  under- 
current that  will  enable  us  to  reach  a  better 
understanding  of  the  real  issues  involved. 
At  all  events,  a  consideration  of  the  present 
war's  deeper  significance  will  set  forth  the 
issue  in  a  clearer  light. 

19 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

In  the  case  of  a  conflict  like  the  present 
one,  involving  actively  almost  four-fifths  of 
the  entire  world  and  affecting  the  remaining 
fifth,  the  presumption  is  that  there  must  be 
some  undercurrent  of  so  fundamental  a 
character  as  to  lead  to  the  varied  and  con- 
fusing manifestations  on  the  surface.  It 
ought  to  be  possible  to  resolve  the  surface 
complications  into  a  formula  that  will  ac- 
count for  the  many-sided  phenomena  pre- 
sented by  the  war.  It  will  be  my  endeavor 
in  these  pages  to  show  that  the  essential 
issue  involved  in  this  war  is  not  political  nor 
economic,  but  moral,  and  it  is  perhaps  best 
to  set  forth,  at  the  outset,  the  thesis  to  be 
established  by  the  discussion,  that  the  moral 
issue  involved  in  this  war  is  the  recognition 
on  the  part  of  the  world  that  an  attempt  to 
carry  out  national  policies  through  the  ap- 
peal to  force,  or  even  by  the  threat  of  force, 
is  a  cardinal  sin  against  the  moral  conscience 
of  mankind.  A  Hebrew  prophet  voiced  the 
message  over  2000  years  ago,  when  he  re- 

20 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

minded  those  who  stood  for  force  and  vio- 
lence in  his  day,  "  Not  by  might  and  not  by 
strength,  but  by  my  word,  says  the  Lord  of 
Hosts."  The  word  is  the  idea,  and  ideas 
must  make  their  way  through  their  inherent 
strength  and  their  direct  appeal.  We  kill 
the  idea  when  we  attempt  to  force  it  upon 
the  world,  and  this  applies  to  the  realm  of 
religion  as  much  as  to  that  of  political 
ambition. 

This,  then,  is  my  theme — that  we  are 
fighting  an  attempt  to  propagate  a  national 
policy  through  military  force,  and  that  this 
issue  is  a  moral  one. 

By  way  of  approach  to  the  subject,  it 
will  be  well  for  us  briefly  to  recall  the  aspect 
presented  by  the  war  at  its  outbreak  in  1914, 
and  to  contrast  that  with  the  situation  at  the 
present  time.  For  a  decade  at  least  pre- 
ceding the  outbreak  the  scene  was  being  set 
in  Europe  for  a  gigantic  struggle.  The  air 
was  becoming  increasingly  heavy  from  year 

to  year,  and  as  the  chief  cause,  though  not 
21 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

necessarily  the  only  one,  for  the  laden  at- 
mosphere we  must  set  down  Germany's  ag- 
gressive policy  in  seeking  domination  in 
the  East.  The  trend  towards  the  East  had 
become  the  watchword  of  an  expansionist 
movement  in  Germany  that  had  its  logical 
outcome  in  the  definite  programof  Pan-Ger- 
manism, and  of  which  the  Bagdad  Railway 
project,  inaugurated  at  the  beginning  of  the 
century,  was  the  visible  expression.  Behind 
the  railway  stood  a  strongly  entrenched  mili- 
tary government  whose  ambitions  were  for 
domination.1  Since  Europe  had  inherited 
from  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  policy  of  the  "  Balance  of  Power  "  be- 
tween the  European  nations  as  the  sole 
means  of  preserving  the  peace,  the  military 
and  political  growth  of  Germany  led  to  an 
alignment  of  France,  Russia  and  England 
as  forces  to  counteract  the  growing  ap- 

1  This  subject  has  been  fully  set  forth  in  Chapter 
III  of  the  author's  recent  work  on  "  The  War  and 
the  Bagdad  Railway"   (Philadelphia,  1917). 
22 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

proach  between  Germany,  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Turkey.  As  an  offset  to  Pan- Ger- 
manism a  Pan- Slavonic  policy  was  pursued, 
looking  to  a  union  of  the  Slavic  States  of 
the  Balkan  Peninsula  under  Russian  con- 
trol. The  situation  was  further  complicated 
by  the  movement  inaugurated  by  Greece 
for  a  combination  of  Balkan  States  against 
Turkey,  followed  by  a  break  in  the  combi- 
nation that  was  quite  as  serious  as  the  short- 
lived union.  Growing  economic  rivalry  be- 
tween England  and  Germany  was  another 
disturbing  factor,  and  since  under  the  his- 
torical traditions  which  have  dominated  Eu- 
rope for  many  centuries,  war  is  always  im- 
minent when  relations  between  European 
nations  become  strained,  the  outbreak  in 
1914  had  all  the  appearance  of  being  a  strug- 
gle between  rivals  for  the  position  of  su- 
premacy in  European  affairs.  The  balance 
of  power  was  upset  or  in  danger  of  being 
upset.  It  is  indeed  amazing  to  see  how 
many  problems  were  confronting  the  Euro- 

23 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

pean  world  in  1914,  any  one  of  which  was 
capable  of  leading  to  an  ordeal  by  battle.2 
To  us  in  this  country,  living  under  skies 
which  normally  make  for  peace,  war  is  the 
last  resort,  but  Europe  has  for  so  many 
centuries  been  living  under  the  shadow  of 
war,  that  a  long  era  of  peace  is  abnormal 
rather  than  normal.  Despite  the  unques- 
tioned leadership  of  European  nations  in 
the  arts  and  sciences,  Europe,  chained  to 
hide-bound  traditions,  is  nearer  to  the  bar- 
baric instinct  to  make  a  test  of  rival  claims 
through  the  appeal  to  arms.  It  was  a  mere 
chance  that  the  war  did  not  break  out  in 
1911  over  the  Agadir  incident,  as  it  was 
a  chance  that  it  came  in  1914  through  the 
firing  of  a  pistol  at  an  Austrian  Archduke. 
But  what  thus  appeared  to  be  at  the  out- 
set a  struggle  for  supremacy  among  Euro- 
pean nations  soon  revealed  itself  as  a  contest 

2  For    a    convenient    and    lucid    survey    of    these 
problems,    see    G.     Lowes    Dickinson,    "  European 
Anarchy  "  (New  York,  1916). 
24 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

of  an  entirely  different  order.  When  a  few 
days  after  the  opening  of  the  war,  Germany 
broke  a  solemn  obligation  and  passed  into 
Belgium  as  a  short-cut  to  France,  the  step 
foreshadowed  the  passing  of  the  war  from 
a  struggle  for  supremacy  into  a  moral  issue. 
The  world  was  at  first  startled  by  the  an- 
nouncement, and  then  grew  indignant  on 
realizing  the  full  significance  of  this  act. 
Those  who,  while  condemning  the  act,  yet 
clung  to  the  Germany  of  their  ideals,  who 
kept  in  their  hearts  memories  of  a  Germany 
that  had  given  the  world  so  much  that  was 
of  value,  hoped  that  some  satisfactory  ex- 
planation might  still  be  forthcoming,  some 
explanation  of  an  act  so  contrary  to  the  tra- 
ditions of  faithfulness — "  Deutsche  Treue  " 
— that  had  found  a  tender  expression  in  Ger- 
man folk-songs,  and  an  impressive  one  in  the 
ethical  systems  of  her  great  thinkers.  The 
frank  confession  of  the  German  Chancellor 
in  his  first  utterance  on  the  subject,  that  the 
step  was  wrong,  and  the  assurance  that  it 

25 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

was  prompted  by  urgent  necessity  of  self- 
defense,  held  out  the  hope  that  at  least  from 
this  point  of  view  the  step  would  be  not  jus- 
tified, for  wrong  cannot  under  any  circum- 
stances be  justified,  but  at  least  given  a  less 
hideous  aspect.  That  confession,  however, 
remains  to  this  day  an  isolated  utterance, 
and  its  sincerity  is  necessarily  questioned  by 
the  brutal  acts  that  followed.  In  the  light 
of  these  acts  it  is  now  seen  that  the  confes- 
sion of  the  Chancellor,  involving  the  admis- 
sion of  not  hesitating  to  commit  a  wrong, 
was  merely  a  cold-blooded  statement  of  a 
policy  which  stopped  short  of  nothing,  and 
which  had  been  determined  upon  long  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Germany's  ruth- 
less treatment  of  Belgium,  involving  a  cate- 
gory of  crimes  almost  unparalleled  in  human 
history,  revealed  in  all  its  hideousness  the 
dastardly  plan,  long  prepared,  to  terrorize 
the  world  into  subjugation  to  the  will  of  a 
military  monster.  Germany,  like  the  Rome 
of  Caesar's  days,  had  enthroned  power  as  her 

26 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

god,  and  ruthless  power  at  that.  Through 
this  deity  the  national  ambitions  were  to  be 
carried  out.  That  is  the  real  significance  of 
the  fatal  step  taken  on  August  3rd;  and 
Germany's  conduct  of  the  war  from  that 
time  to  the  present,  involving  the  applica- 
tion of  all  the  cruel  refinements  of  modern 
science  to  warfare,  has  helped  to  clarify  the 
moral  issue  as  it  has  united  the  greater  part 
of  the  civilized  world  in  the  determination 
to  stamp  out  a  spirit  and  a  policy  which  has 
brought  upon  mankind  the  bloodiest  con- 
flict in  history.  All  other  issues  which  ap- 
peared to  be  contributing  causes  for  the  out- 
break of  the  war  have  receded  into  the 
background.  The  one  figure  that  has  stood 
out  for  almost  four  years  against  an  angry 
sky  is  the  man  in  "  shining  armor,"  deter- 
mined at  all  hazards  to  carry  out  forcibly 
national  ambitions.  A  new  Constantine  has 
arisen  who  sees,  instead  of  a  Cross  in  the 
heavens,  a  sword  in  hoc  signo  vinces — "  By 
this  sign  conquer." 

27 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

II 

The  issue  has  been  resolved  through  the 
policy  followed  by  the  German  government 
in  the  conduct  of  the  war  into  a  moral  one. 
It  is  a  struggle  of  the  civilized  world  against 
the  systematic  plan  of  that  government  to 
oppose  the  currents  of  the  age  by  the  exhi- 
bition of  force.  The  German  government 
claims  to  be  waging  a  defensive  war.  That 
is  true.  But  what  that  government  is  de- 
fending is  not  the  boundaries  of  the  country 
or  the  existence  of  Germany  as  a  nation,  but 
a  policy  that  can  only  be  carried  out  by  mili- 
tary strength,  a  system  of  terrorization  that 
if  successful  will  spell  the  moral  downfall 
of  the  world,  as  well  as  its  submission  to  a 
Moloch  of  brute  power.  For  this  reason 
the  civilized  world,  with  the  exception  of  the 
nations  whose  interests  are  for  the  time  being 
so  closely  bound  up  with  Germany  that  they 
cannot  cut  loose,  or  whose  geographic  posi- 
tion forbids  a  participation  in  the  conflict — 
with  these  exceptions,  the  entire  civilized 

28 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

world  has  risen  almost  instinctively  against 
the  glorification  of  power.  This  rebellion  is 
not  due  to  hostility  towards  a  people,  nor 
does  it  arise  from  a  desire  to  inflict  an  in- 
jury on  a  great  country,  but  solely  from  the 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  resort  to 
power  in  enforcing  a  national  policy  is  an 
immoral  act,  fraught  with  danger  to  human- 
ity and  to  humanitarianism.  This  is  the  real 
issue  in  the  war  as  it  has  gradually  shaped 
itself  during  the  past  three  years.  The  war 
has  become  a  crusade  for  saving  the  world 
from  the  domination  of  force. 

That  Germany  with  her  noteworthy 
record  of  achievement  in  art,  in  science,  in 
philosophy,  in  literature,  in  music,  and  in 
so  many  other  domains  should  thus  have  be- 
come a  menace  to  the  world  is  a  matter  of 
bitter  regret  and)  profound  disappointment 
to  the  many  who  from  direct  knowledge  had 
learned  to  appreciate  all  that  the  older  Ger- 
many stood  for.  But  facts  must  be  recog- 
nized, no  matter  how  painful  such  recogni- 

29 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

tion  may  be.  Nor  can  personal  attachment 
deter  us  from  realizing  the  full  significance 
of  the  moral  issue,  as  also  the  necessity,  for 
the  sake  of  Germany  as  well  as  for  the  world, 
of  fighting  it  out  until  the  causes  that  have 
brought  about  the  issue  shall  have  been  re- 
moved. No  truer  and  no  more  penetrating 
word  was  ever  spoken  than  the  insistence  by 
the  President  of  this  Republic,  on  various 
occasions,  upon  the  distinction  to  be  made 
between  the  German  government  and  the 
German  people.  On  the  surface,  to  be  sure, 
no  such  distinction  exists  or  can  exist,  for 
in  fighting  this  moral  issue,  our  forces  are 
necessarily  directed  against  the  people  who 
constitute  the  armies  of  Germany.  It  must 
also  be  admitted,  as  will  be  shown  further 
on,  that  the  system  of  government  which 
has  created  the  moral  issue  has  affected  the 
mental  calibre  of  the  people  living  under 
such  a  system  and  their  outlook  on  life,  but 
the  recognition  of  this  fact  furnishes  merely 
further  proof  for  the  contention  that  if  we 

30 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

probe  beneath  the  surface  we  will  find  the 
ultimate  reason  for  the  conflict  to  lie  in  the 
character  of  the  government  and  not  in  the 
character  of  the  people,  for  it  is  this  govern- 
ment which  stands  out  as  the  embodiment  of 
material  power,  and  not  the  people.  It  is 
this  government  that  by  placing  force  be- 
hind national  ambitions  has  directly  created 
the  moral  issue.  It  is  a  fact,  therefore,  that 
what  we  are  really  fighting  are  the  evil 
forces  let  loose  through  the  system  of  gov- 
ernment prevailing  in  Germany.  It  is  this 
system  which  has  by  a  logical  sequence  led  to 
Germany's  conduct  of  the  war  in  defiance 
of  all  humanitarian  considerations,  as  well 
as  frequent  disregard  of  the  postulates  of 
international  law.  This  system  spells  force ; 
it  translates  the  policy  of  a  people  into  terms 
of  force.  It  is  a  system  which  does  not  rea- 
son or  argue;  it  points  to  the  sword  as  its 
first  and  last  appeal.  Such  a  system  natur- 
ally mocks  at  all  moral  considerations.  It 
brushes  them  aside  as  the  sickly  fancies  of 

31 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

impractical  dreamers.  A  system  which  is 
symbolized  by  a  military  machine,  perfected 
to  do  its  work  with  unerring  precision,  rec- 
ognizes no  law  except  that  underlying  its 
own  being.  Germany's  conduct  of  the  war 
is  in  consistent  accord  with  the  system ;  and 
when  I  speak  of  her  conduct,  I  do  not  mean 
merely — though  I  do  mean  primarily — the 
recourse  to  such  mediaeval  practices  as  the 
taking  and  shooting  of  hostages,  and  such 
primitive  barbarities  as  wholesale  deporta- 
tions— the  favorite  policy  of  the  old  Assyr- 
ian conquerors — and  all  the  varied  barbari- 
ties in  her  method  of  warfare.  I  do  not  mean 
merely  terrorizing  the  inhabitants  of  in- 
vaded districts  by  wanton  acts  of  destruc- 
tion to  serve  as  warnings.  I  include  also 
the  elaborate  spy  system  so  carefully  organ- 
ized that  its  branches,  like  the  net-work  of 
an  ugly  spider,  reach  in  all  directions.  I  in- 
clude the  insidious  propaganda,  which  has 
assumed  enormous  dimensions;  I  include 
the  sinister  intrigues  and  the  rhetorical  cam- 

32 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

ouflage  of  the  military  and  diplomatic  pol- 
icy, until  the  atmosphere  becomes  so  thick 
with  insidious  deception  that  when  an  official 
utterance  comes  from  Germany  the  world  no 
longer  takes  such  an  utterance  at  its  face 
value  but  seeks  for  some  hidden  meaning. 
It  almost  takes  for  granted  that  when  Ger- 
many speaks  through  her  Chancellor,  she 
does  not  mean  what  she  says,  but  something 
else.  All  this  is  a  direct  outcome  of  the  sys- 
tem, and  an  inherent  part  of  it ;  and  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  condition  of  affairs  thus  called 
into  being  removes  the  basis  for  any  under- 
standing between  Germany  and  the  other 
nations.  It  intensifies  a  hundred-fold  the 
definition  of  the  diplomat  of  the  old  school, 
who  was  described  as  a  person  sent  abroad 
to  lie  for  his  country.  The  world  cannot 
breathe  freely  in  such  an  atmosphere,  poi- 
soned by  the  asphyxiating  gases  of  dissem- 
blance and  deception.  Cruelty  and  dishon- 
esty thus  become  the  corollary  expressions 
of  a  system  of  government  which  finds  its 

3  33 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

sole  support  in  force — and  cruelty  and  dis- 
honesty are  immoral  forces  that  must  be  re- 
moved at  all  hazards  before  the  world  can 
again  pursue  the  even  tenor  of  its  way. 

The  present  conflict,  therefore,  I  urge,  is 
primarily  a  moral  issue,  a  determination  to 
strike  at  the  root  of  the  evil  which  has  pro- 
duced the  present  calamitous  condition  of 
the  world.  That  root  is  a  system  of  govern- 
ment out  of  keeping  with  the  stage  of  moral 
development  that  the  world  has  reached.  In 
saying  this,  one  is  far  from  implying  that  the 
other  nations  of  the  world,  including  our- 
selves, have  a  clean  bill  of  moral  health.  In 
fighting  for  the  moral  issue  that  I  am  try- 
ing to  define,  we  are  not  putting  ourselves 
on  an  eminence,  with  a  claim  to  moral  per- 
fection, nor  are  we  assuming  the  attitude  of 
a  supreme  judge  sitting  in  judgment  over 
a  nation.  We  are  simply  giving  voice  to  the 
present-day  conscience  of  humanity — a 
voice  that  is  also  heard  in  Germany,  though 
not  as  yet  with  sufficient  strength — a  voice 

34 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

which  is  determined  to  abolish  a  system  for 
which  there  is  no  room,  even  in  a  world  like 
ours,  so  far  removed  as  yet  from  moral  per- 
fection. Aye,  just  because  we  recognize 
how  far  we  still  are  from  the  goal  of  more 
perfect  justice,  towards  which  one  hopes  that 
mankind  is  aiming  and  striving,  do  we  feel 
the  supreme  importance  of  fighting  for  the 
triumph  of  the  cause  which  has  carried  us 
into  the  war. 

For  I  hold  that  it  is  this  moral  issue  which 
has  led  us,  step  by  step,  until  the  time  seemed 
ripe  to  take  the  final  leap  which  landed  us 
into  the  midst  of  the  conflict.  There  are 
those,  probably  many,  who  feel  that  this  step 
should  have  been  taken  earlier.  But  here 
again,  if  we  have  regard  for  the  undercur- 
rents instead  of  being  carried  away  by  sole 
consideration  for  surface  events,  there  seems 
to  have  been  a  good  reason  why  we  entered 
the  war  at  the  time  that  we  did  and  not 
earlier.  The  moral  issue  was  foreshadowed, 
as   has   been   pointed   out,   by   Germany's 

35 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

breaking  her  solemn  obligation  given  to 
Belgium.  From  the  point  of  view  of  1917 
that  becomes  perfectly  clear,  but  the  moral 
issue  was  not  crystallized  until  the  war  had 
proceeded  far  enough  to  reveal  the  aim  of 
the  military  clique  in  control  in  Germany, 
in  all  its  danger  to  the  safety  of  the  world. 
The  significance  of  our  entrance  is  all  the 
greater  because  it  came  at  a  moment  when 
the  original  aspect  of  the  war  had  been  en- 
tirely changed,  and  it  had  definitely  become 
what  it  is  to-day,  a  fight  against  the  evil 
forces  let  loose  through  the  military  system, 
dominant  in  Germany.  Even  the  vengeance 
for  a  wrong  inflicted,  which  may  prompt  a 
people  to  rise  in  its  wrath,  is  given  a  higher 
sanction  when  it  is  put  in  the  service  of  a 
great  cause  affecting  all  mankind. 

Our  entry  as  a  mighty  people,  bound  by 
its  traditions  to  peace  and  not  to  war,  a 
nation  pacifist  by  nature  and  by  its  convic- 
tions, solemnizes  the  war  because  of  the 
moral  issue  involved.     The  spirit  in  which 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

we  have  entered  the  war  further  illustrates 
that  issue.  Think  of  the  thousands  of  men 
and  women  who  have  left  their  ordinary 
tasks,  many  at  considerable  sacrifice,  to  de- 
vote themselves  to  humanitarian  service — 
to  carry  the  wounded  from  the  battle-field, 
to  win  them  back  to  health,  or  to  give  them 
such  aid  as  is  possible  in  their  dying  hours ; 
to  assist  in  restoring  what  the  engines  of  war 
have  destroyed,  to  maintain  the  morale  and 
the  courage  of  those  facing  the  dangers  and 
hardships  of  the  trenches.  Even  before  we 
formally  entered  upon  the  war,  these  volun- 
teers by  the  hundreds  and  thousands  came 
from  every  side,  inspired  in  most  cases  by 
the  deathless  courage  of  France  and  Belgium 
— because  France  and  Belgium  stood  up  for 
the  moral  issue  and  faced  annihilation  at  the 
hands  of  a  strong,  almost  invincible,  foe 
rather  than  yield  to  a  system  which  refused 
to  be  bound  by  moral  considerations.  These 
volunteers,  many  of  them  entering  as  sol- 
diers into  the  armies  of  a  nation  not  their 

37 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

own,  were  the  advance  guards  of  the  large 
force  which  is  now  being  gathered  to  swell 
the  ranks  of  those  who  are  taking  their  stand 
as  the  bulwarks  against  the  encroachment  of 
power — to  hold  the  line  that  means  the  safe- 
guarding of  liberty  and  of  civilization.  This 
enthusiasm,  more  particularly  for  France, 
which  is  as  marked  as  it  is  sincere,  is  a  symp- 
tom of  the  recognition  of  the  moral  issue 
involved  in  the  war.  It  is  not  prompted 
merely  by  gratitude  for  what  France  did 
for  this  country  during  our  struggle  for  lib- 
erty and  independence,  for  only  a  few  of 
those  who  volunteered  can  be  directly  con- 
scious of  any  such  feeling.  Nor  is  it  merely 
love  for  France,  strong  and  deep  as  that 
feeling  is  in  this  country,  for  many  of  the 
volunteers  have  never  known  that  country, 
nor  prior  to  the  war  had  any  special  rela- 
tions with  it.  No,  the  movement  was,  pri- 
marily, a  response  to  the  aroused  conscience 
of  mankind  to  bring  about  the  triumph  of 
the  moral  issue  involved  in  the  war.    Men 

38 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

and  women  have  been  moved  to  come  to  the 
aid  of  France  in  this  war  from  the  same 
feeling  that  led  idealistic  Frenchmen  to  come 
to  our  aid  140  years  ago.  In  both  cases  the 
moral  issue  was  the  impelling  factor,  and 
that  factor  dominates  the  readiness  to  self- 
sacrifice  shown  by  all  classes  of  citizens 
throughout  the  country — aye,  the  anxiety 
of  all  to  help,  each  in  his  or  her  way,  in  the 
great  cause  which  has  so  completely  trans- 
formed the  life  of  this  country  within  the 
short  span  of  a  year.  The  business  man, 
from  the  magnate  to  the  clerk,  has  left  his 
office;  the  lawyer  has  closed  his  desk;  the 
doctor  has  given  up  his  practice;  the  teacher 
his  class-room;  the  clergyman  his  pulpit — 
all  to  give  themselves  up  to  public  service. 
Thousands  upon  thousands  had  volunteered 
their  services  in  the  army  and  navy  before 
the  draft  was  promulgated.  Women  of  all 
ranks  and  women  everywhere  have  aban- 
doned thoughts  of  self  to  throw  themselves 
into  relief  work.    Their  hands  are  busy  from 

39 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

morning  to  night  to  provide  comfort  for 
the  fighters  and  aid  for  the  wounded. 

Let  us  not  underestimate  the  meaning  of 
this  remarkable  demonstration,  nor  in  a 
cynical  spirit  pick  out  instances  of  selfish 
interest  or  the  love  of  adventure  that  in 
some  cases  may  have  been  contributing  fac- 
tors. We  are  witnessing  a  great  movement 
and  a  movement  that  needs  to  be  interpreted 
by  a  worthy  motive.  Is  it  patriotism?  Yes, 
but  not  that  alone.  Back  of  patriotism — 
perhaps  unconscious  to  many — is  the  feeling 
of  the  higher  cause  involved  in  the  war,  a 
cause  higher  than  mere  preservation  of  self, 
higher  even  than  mere  preservation  of  one's 
country.  That  deeper  cause  animating  the 
entire  movement  of  the  war  can  be  no  other, 
it  seems  to  me,  than  the  aroused  conscience 
of  mankind,  not  to  take  vengeance,  not  to 
crush  or  destroy  a  nation,  but  to  crush  and 
destroy  a  system  that  represents  an  evil 
force — a  force  that  is  destroying  the  nation 
thai  it  holds  in  its  grasp,  destroying  and 

40 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

crushing  that  nation  as  effectively — aye, 
even  more  so — than  the  armies  of  the  world 
p^f  awn  up  against  the  monstrous  alliance  be- 
tween power  and  national  policy.  We  are 
fighting  for  a  principle,  for  the  overthrow 
of  a  system  that  links  national  policies  with 
power  as  the  means  of  carrying  them  out. 
That  principle  needs  to  be  established  not 
merely  to  insure  our  own  safety,  but  to  in- 
sure the  world  against  another  outbreak 
such  as  the  one  that  has  now  plunged  man- 
kind in  deepest  grief  and  suffering  for  al- 
most four  years.  The  moral  issue  involved 
in  this  war  against  the  abuse  of  power  offers 
the  strongest  support  to  the  cause  in  which 
we  are  engaged,  and  the  firmest  assurance, 
also,  of  its  ultimate  triumph. 

Ill 

But  the  question  may  well  be  raised  as  a 
challenge  to  this  proposition:  Have  not  all 
the  nations  of  the  past  and  present,  includ- 
ing our  own,  been  made  by  war,  by  the  ex- 

41 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

ercise  of  power?  Has  not  the  world  always 
been  dominated  by  force  ?  Is  there  any  great 
nation  that  has  not  pushed  its  way  by  the 
exercise  of  material  power,  often  brushing 
aside  the  weaker  which  stood  as  an  obstacle 
in  the  way?  This  is  undoubtedly  true.  But 
note  the  verdict  of  history  on  all  attempts 
to  carry  the  policy  of  force  beyond  very 
definite  bounds.  "  Die  Weltgeschichte  ist 
das  Weltgericht,"  says  Schiller.  History  is 
the  supreme  judge  that  has  invariably  pro- 
nounced the  doom  when  even  what  is  right 
makes  a  definite  alliance  with  might,  and 
depends  upon  power  to  carry  out  its  aims. 

Let  us  take,  as  perhaps  the  most  striking 
example,  the  imperialistic  policy  of  Rome. 
At  the  outset  of  her  career  the  spirit  of 
Rome  was  inherently  opposed  to  the  idea  of 
conquest.  Rome  grew  by  natural  expansion, 
and  the  fundamental  principle  of  that  ex- 
pansion was  not  domination  over  increasing 
territory,  but  the  extension  of  the  scope  of 
Roman    citizenship.      Even    when    Rome 

42 


k    '-4A* 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

passed  beyond  her  natural  borders,  and 
stretched  her  grasp  over  lands  lying  outside, 
to  the  Spanish  Peninsula  on  the  West,  to 
Africa  on  the  South,  to  the  Greek  cities  and 
to  Asia  Minor  on  the  East,  it  was  done  in 
part,  as  the  Carthaginian  wars  show,  in  self- 
defense  against  hostile  and  insidious  neigh- 
bors, and  in  part  in  response  to  appeals  of 
weaker  nations  and  states  to  Rome,  to  come 
to  their  support  against  encroachment  on 
their  domain  on  the  part  of  ambitious  and 
stronger  enemies.  Recent  investigations  of 
Roman  imperialism 3  have  shown  that  it  is 
not  until  we  reach  the  days  of  Julius  Caesar, 
when  Rome  had  already  become  mistress  of 
the  eastern  world  by  her  broad  and  unselfish 
policy,  that  the  spirit  of  domination  by 
forcible  conquest  replaces  the  earlier  policy 
of  logical  and  natural  expansion  under  the 
guiding  principle  of  extending  the  scope  of 

3  See  the  admirable  and  splendidly  written  work 
of  Prof.  Tenney  Frank,  "  Roman  Imperialism " 
(New  York,  1914). 

43 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

Roman  citizenship,  without  crushing  the  in- 
dependent spirit  of  those  nations  that  came 
under  Rome's  jurisdiction.  Caesar  marks 
the  beginning  of  a  new  era,  the  attempt  to 
force  the  Roman  idea  upon  the  world;  but 
Caesar  also  points  to  the  beginning  of  Rome's 
decline,  which  Gibbon  significantly  dates 
from  the  accession  of  Augustus.  The  new 
Rome  succeeds  in  dominating  the  world,  but 
at  the  cost  of  becoming,  by  virtue  of  her 
policy  of  forcible  conquest,  a  menace  that 
leads  by  the  logical  force  of  events  to  the 
division  of  the  Empire,  and  eventually  to 
the  formation  of  independent  states  in  north- 
ern and  southern  Europe.  The  underlying 
theory  of  the  Roman  Empire  and  the  idea 
upon  which  it  rested  was  a  magnificent  and 
inspiring  one,  to  confer  the  benefits  of 
Roman  citizenship,  "the  heir  of  all  the 
ages,"  upon  the  whole  world.  It  actually 
did  confer  many  of  those  benefits,  despite 
the  spirit  of  domination  which  set  in,  but 
when  Rome  enthroned  power  as  the  perma- 

44 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

nent  head  of  the  pantheon  she  committed  the 
cardinal  sin  which  led  to  her  own  undoing. 
Napoleon,  only  a  century  removed  from 
our  day,  furnishes  an  equally  striking  illus- 
tration of  the  theme.  That  great  and  illus- 
trious figure  comes  forward  as  a  liberating 
force  in  Europe.  As  his  armies  swept 
through  Europe,  they  carried  with  them  the 
ideas  of  the  French  Revolution,  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  sovereignty  of  a  people  in 
place  of  the  domination  of  an  autocratic 
group  over  a  people.  The  Russian  cam- 
paign, disastrous  as  it  was  for  Napoleon, 
laid  the  seed  for  the  movement  that  in  our 
own  days  germinated  in  the  liberation  of 
Russia,  first  from  serfdom  and  recently 
from  official  thraldom;  and  yet  Napoleon, 
yielding  to  the  temptation  to  join  might 
with  right,  and  making  this  combination  the 
very  foundation  of  his  policy,  became  the 
greatest  danger  to  the  freedom  and  to  the 
free  life  of  the  European  nations,  who  were 
forced  to  combine  against  him  for  his  over- 

45 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

throw.    The  issue  in  the  Napoleonic  wars 
was  at  bottom  likewise  a  moral  one. 

But,  someone  will  object,  how  about 
Great  Britain?  Has  she  not  also  followed 
an  imperialistic  policy?  Now,  imperialism 
as  it  actually  appears  in  the  world's  history 
is  not  all  of  one  color.  Its  shades  vary  from 
the  dark  hue  of  the  Assyrian-Babylonian 
policy,  to  dominate  the  world  by  crushing 
the  independent  life  of  the  nations  subdued, 
to  the  brighter  shade  of  the  humane  policy 
of  the  Persian  kings  led  by  Cyrus.  Cyrus 
reversed  the  process  and  granted  a  large 
measure  of  autonomy  for  the  unfolding  of 
national  life  among  the  peoples  over  whom 
he  exercised  a  supervisory  control.  Persian 
imperialism  approached  the  idea  of  a  federa- 
tion of  nations  under  a  unit  control,  though 
naturally  it  was  far  removed  from  the  mod- 
ern aspect  of  such  a  federation.  It  was 
Assyria  whose  example  was  followed  by  the 
later  Babylonian  empire  that  introduced  the 
cruel  principle  of  deporting  the  best  and 

46 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

most  useful  elements  of  a  conquered  popu- 
lation, so  as  to  prevent  a  resuscitation  of  the 
national  spirit.  Sargon,  the  Assyrian,  and 
Nebuchadnezzar,  the  Babylonian,  as  the 
representatives  of  dominating  imperialism, 
deported  the  Jews  to  the  Euphrates  Valley 
and  elsewhere.  Cyrus  permitted  them  to 
return  as  an  expression  of  his  more  liberal 
imperialistic  policy.  Greek  imperialism, 
associated  with  Alexander  the  Great,  was 
largely  a  cultural  movement,  bringing  about 
an  exchange  between  Greek  and  Oriental 
ideas  that  led,  as  one  of  the  results  of  this 
commingling,  to  Christianity.  Rome  in  her 
earlier  days  followed  along  the  path  mapped 
out  by  Cyrus  and  Alexander  the  Great, 
while  Great  Britain  may  be  instanced  as  an 
illustration  of  carrying  on  an  imperialistic 
policy  which,  while  it  does  contain  features 
that  cannot  endure  the  strict  ethical  test,  has 
nevertheless  avoided  the  pitfalls  which 
Roman  and  Napoleonic  imperialism  en- 
countered. England's  expansion,  prompted 

47 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

by  her  position  as  an  island  power,  has  not 
been  carried  on  under  the  protection  of  an 
elaborate  military  system.  It  could  not,  of 
course,  have  been  carried  on  without  power, 
but  that  power  has  been  kept  within  bounds.4 
England's  policy  has  generally  been  tem- 
pered by  a  readiness  to  preserve  the  national 
life  of  those  who  came  under  her  domina- 

4  Lord  Acton  in  one  of  his  letters,  recently  pub- 
lished, "  Selections  from  the  Correspondence  of  the 
First  Lord  Acton,"  vol.  i,  page  249,  shows  the  dis- 
tinction to  be  made  between  Navalism  used  by  an 
island  power  as  a  means  of  defense  and  retaining 
control  of  possessions,  and  a  military  system  which 
by  its  very  presence  spells  domination.  "  A  fleet 
with  an  army  is  an  instrument  of  militarism.  A 
fleet  without  one  is  not."  It  is  a  significant  index  of 
the  aggressive  character  of  Germany's  military  Im- 
perialism, that  in  addition  to  already  having  the  most 
powerful  army,  she  was  also  determined  to  have  a 
powerful  navy.  This  meant  Navalism  plus  Militar- 
ism, and  naturally  helped  to  bring  on  the  crisis  by 
increasing  suspicion  of  Germany's  ulterior  designs. 
Lord  Cromer,  in  his  penetrating  analysis  of  "  Ancient 
and  Modern  Imperialism"  (London,  1910),  points 
out  the  general  agreement  between  British  Imperial- 
ism and  the  earlier  policy  of  Rome. 
48 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

tion.  She  went  beyond  legitimate  bounds 
in  two  instances  and  paid  dearly  for  it. 
One  was  her  treatment  of  Ireland,  the  result 
of  which  has  cost  her  such  infinite  trouble, 
and  the  other  was  the  fatal  mistake  that  she 
made  in  endeavoring  to  force  her  will  upon 
the  American  colonies,  and  which  cost  her 
the  allegiance  of  these  colonies.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  Great  Britain  has  in  two  recent 
instances  furnished  a  notable  example  of  an 
imperialistic  policy  conducted  along  higher 
lines,  that  form  a  parallel  to  Persian  and  to 
the  earlier  Roman  imperialism  before  it  be- 
came pure  conquest  and  domination.  In 
South  Africa  she  has  given  a  pledge  of  good 
faith  by  according  to  the  Boers  the  fullest 
measure  of  political  liberty;  and  in  Egypt 
by  the  exercise  of  a  wise  protectorate  she 
has  brought  about  a  marvelous  transforma- 
tion in  economic  conditions  in  that  country, 
suggesting  the  resuscitation  of  the  great 
prosperity  that  characterized  the  Nile  Val- 
ley in  ancient  times.     British  imperialism 

4  49 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

has  moved  rapidly  within  our  days  towards 
a  great  Federalized  Empire,  allowing  full- 
est scope  for  the  development  of  the  various 
states  and  divisions,  and  with  no  thought  of 
subjugation  of  dependent  peoples. 

The  parallel,  however,  suggested  by  Ger- 
many's policy  is  that  with  Caesarian  imper- 
ialism, and  the  particular  point  in  the  par- 
allel to  which  attention  should  be  drawn  is 
the  totally  different  aspect  given  to  a  na- 
tional policy  the  moment  the  attempt  is 
made  to  enforce  it  by  the  appeal  to  sheer 
power  or  through  the  threat  of  force.  Such 
an  appeal  or  threat  is  in  order  only  in  self- 
defense,  to  protect  the  national  frontiers  of 
a  nation,  or  to  ward  off  a  threatened  attack ; 
but  when  it  is  made  for  the  deliberate  pur- 
pose of  aiding  territorial  or  political  expan- 
sion, to  be  carried  out  even  at  the  expense 
of  the  claims  or  liberties  of  others,  a  moral 
issue  invariably  arises  which  must  be  fought 
out  to  the  finish.  The  ambition  of  Germany 

to  spread  her  commerce,  to  capture  the  mar- 
so 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

kets  of  the  world  for  the  products  of  her 
industries,  was  not  only  perfectly  legitimate 
but  one  that  under  ordinary  circumstances 
would  have  benefited  the  world  as  well  as 
herself.  Taking  even  the  main  aim  of  Pan- 
Germanism,  the  control  of  the  highway 
across  Asia  Minor,  and  regarding  it  as  the 
means  of  opening  up  an  important  region 
of  the  world  that  has  in  the  past  played  so 
notable  a  part  in  the  world's  history,  and  we 
must  in  a  just  and  impartial  spirit  com- 
mend not  only  the  main  project  of  a  railway 
connecting  two  poles  of  the  East,  Constan- 
tinople and  Bagdad,  a  project  of  the  same 
large  vision  as  the  cutting  of  the  Suez  and 
Panama  Canals,  but  we  may  also  recognize 
the  great  benefits  of  such  an  enterprise 
towards  the  resuscitation  of  the  ancient 
East.  An  English  writer 5  has  recently 
called    the    project    "  a    great    conception 

5  J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  "  The  Eastern  Question,  An 
Historical  Study  in  European  Diplomacy  "  (Oxford, 
1917),  page  359. 

51 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

worthy  of  a  scientific  and  systematic  peo- 
ple." But  note  how  the  project  becomes  a 
veritable  curse  the  moment  that  a  powerful 
government  steps  behind  it  and  attempts  to 
use  it,  by  the  threat  of  militarism,  for  a  po- 
litical domination  of  the  East  which  neces- 
sarily could  only  be  carried  out  at  the 
cost  of  the  interests  of  the  sister  nations 
of  the  world.6 

Such  a  policy  of  domination,  which  would 
be  intolerable  no  matter  by  what  nation  it 
would  be  attempted,  is  again  a  logical  out- 
come of  a  system  of  government  which 
recognizes  force  as  its  main  prop,  and  which 
is  built  up  on  a  foundation  of  force.  If 
Pan-Germanism  had  arisen  from  a  natural 
need  of  expansion,  it  would  have  been  kept 
within  the  bounds  proper  to  such  an  expan- 
sion. The  movement  might  have  been  of 
inestimable  benefit  to  the  world  in  general 

6  See  the  further  discussion  of  this  point  in  the 
author's  "  The  War  and  the  Bagdad  Railway," 
pages  117  et  seq. 

52 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

as  well  as  to  Germany,  if  it  had  led,  let  us 
say,  in  order  to  provide  an  outlet  for  a  rap- 
idly growing  population,  to  the  establish- 
ment of  colonies  in  various  parts  of  the 
world,  with  due  consideration  for  the  rights 
of  those  already  inhabiting  the  regions  to  be 
colonized.  But  Pan- Germanism  proceeded 
on  the  theory  that  the  power  of  Germany 
must  be  extended;  that  Germany  was  to 
occupy  a  more  prominent  place  in  the  sun, 
to  use  the  phrase  of  her  former  Chancellor. 
It  was  power  and  always  power,  and  noth- 
ing but  power,  that  was  urged  in  connection 
with  the  national  policy.  The  expansionist 
movement  was  linked  to  the  military  system 
of  government,  until  it  became  a  mere  ap- 
pendage to  that  system,  with  the  result  that 
Pan-Germanism  shares  with  the  military 
system  the  condemnation  expressed  in  the 
revolt  of  the  world  against  domination 
through  such  a  system.  This  aspect  of  Pan- 
Germanism  removes  what  force  there  might 
otherwise  rest  in  the  claim  of  those  who  may 

53 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

be  regarded  as  the  intellectual  satellites  of 
the  movement,  that  Germany  by  her  na- 
tional policy  was  actuated  by  a  benevolent 
desire  to  give  the  rest  of  the  world  the  bene- 
fit of  her  civilization,  to  spread  the  German 
"  Kultur,"  to  use  the  conventional  phrase, 
throughout  the  world,  just  as  the  Greeks 
scattered  Greek  civilization  through  the  con- 
quest of  Alexander  the  Great,  and  as  Rome 
wished  to  extend  the  benefits  and  privileges 
of  Roman  citizenship  through  her  imperial- 
ism to  the  entire  world.  How  can  the  mod- 
ern world  take  kindly  to  a  civilization  that  is 
to  be  forced  upon  it  by  the  sword?  How 
can  mankind  be  expected  to  judge  that  civi- 
lization, when  preached  by  the  utter  disre- 
gard of  the  sanctity  of  treaties  and  by  the 
justification  of  cruelties  and  barbarities  on 
the  ground  of  their  being  military  measures, 
as  anything  else  but  a  thin  disguise  for  im- 
posing in  reality  the  autliority  of  Germany 
upon  the  world  ?  A  country  extends  the  in- 
fluence of  her  civilization  by  the  teachings 

54 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

in  her  schools  and  her  universities,  by  the 
writings  of  her  scholars,  by  the  works  of  her 
artists,  by  the  spread  of  her  manufactures, 
by  the  examples  of  her  citizens  in  the  con- 
duct of  their  lives,  and  by  the  spirit  of  her 
institutions.  The  spread  of  Greek  civiliza- 
tion did  not  mean  imposing  the  Greek  cul- 
ture upon  the  world,  but  a  commingling  of 
the  cultural  currents  of  the  East  and  the 
West.  Greek  imperialism  carried  with  it 
an  exchange  of  ideas  and  of  ideals,  not  the 
substitution  of  one  civilization  for  all  the 
others  to  satisfy  the  national  conceit  of  a 
people,  carried  away  by  the  delusion  that  the 
civilization  of  the  world  must  be  of  one  hue. 
German  civilization  with  its  lights  and 
shades  is  an  outcome  of  the  development  of 
the  Germanic  spirit  along  specific  lines  and 
under  definite  restrictions.  It  is  not  acci- 
dental that  Germany,  as  Brandes  well  puts 
it,  has  remained  a  center  of  conservatism  in 
the  middle  of  Europe,  clinging  to  outgrown 
theories  of  the  State,  bound  to  mediaeval 

55 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

traditions  of  sovereignty  and  opposed  to  the 
new  international  spirit  that  within  the  past 
century  has  swept  throughout  the  world,  but 
has  passed  Germany  by.  German  civiliza- 
tion shows  the  results  of  an  exaggerated 
emphasis  on  nationalism.  The  very  insist- 
ence of  her  leaders  upon  the  superiority  of 
her  cultural  achievements  reveals  as  one  of 
her  serious  defects  the  hostility  to  the  larger 
international  view.  Granting,  therefore,  the 
sincerity  of  her  intellectuals  in  their  advo- 
cacy of  the  crusade  for  German  civilization 
as  the  primary  factor  behind  the  national 
policy  of  conquest  and  domination,  that  ad- 
vocacy merely  reveals  the  wilful  blindness 
or  the  incapacity  of  her  men  of  science  to 
realize  that  what  they  are  endeavoring  to 
bring  about  is  the  spread  of  power,  not  of 
civilization.  The  German  professors  are 
merely  supplying  the  theoretic  support  for 
the  military  ambitions  of  the  class  that  at 
present  controls  the  destinies  of  the  country. 
They  are  merely  strengthening  by  their 

56 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

attitude  the  tight  grasp  of  the  military 
autocracy  upon  the  people,  that  wishes 
to  strangle  all  independence  of  political 
thought  and  endeavor.  The  cry  of  a  crusade 
for  German  "  Kultur  "  is  thus  degraded  to 
the  low  level  of  a  decoy  by  the  unholy 
alliance  between  power  and  national  policy. 
Indeed,  in  the  light  of  Belgium  and  the 
sinking  of  the  Lusitania  with  its  cargo  of 
innocent  noncombatants,  it  is  not  surprising 
(though  exceedingly  sad)  to  find  German 
civilization  held  up  as  a  mockery  and  a  by- 
word. The  combination  of  military  power 
with  cultural  aims  leads  to  a  travesty  of 
genuine  "  Kultur."  The  attempt  to  justify 
military  domination  by  an  appeal  to  eco- 
nomic policy,  further  supported  by  an  erro- 
neous theory  of  the  method  of  spreading  civi- 
lization, serves  only  to  intensify  the  serious- 
ness of  the  menace  to  the  world  involved  in 
the  special  brand  of  German  imperialism; 
and  clarifies  the  moral  issue  that  underlies 
the  war.    From  whatever  angle,  therefore, 

57 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

we  view  the  conflict,  whether  from  the  point 
of  view  of  Germany's  conduct  of  the  war,  or 
from  the  point  of  view  of  Pan-Germanistic 
policy,  which  became  bound  up  with  the  mili- 
tary system,  or  from  the  point  of  view  advo- 
cated by  her  misguided  intellectual  leaders 
who  play  into  the  hands  of  the  military  au- 
tocracy and  of  Pan- Germanism,  we  reach 
the  same  conclusion,  that  in  the  final  analysis 
the  issue  in  this  war  is  a  moral  one. 

IV 

The  moral  issue  has  transformed  a  natur- 
ally pacifist  nation  in  the  course  of  the  past 
year  into  a  people  in  arms.  Even  those 
whose  instincts,  training  and  deeper  convic- 
tions would  prompt  them  to  protest  against 
war  as  in  itself  an  immoral  force — and  I 
number  myself  among  those  who  feel  that 
war  involves  a  temporary  lapse  into  bar- 
barism, since  war  cannot  be  looked  upon  as 
anything  else  than  a  survival  of  barbaric 
times — yet  nevertheless  feel  that  they  must 

58 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

conquer  a  natural  repugnance  to  war  in 
order  to  array  themselves  on  the  side  of  those 
fighting  for  a  moral  issue.  The  moral  issue 
makes  this  war  what  has  been  called  the 
"  pacifist's  war/' 7  for  it  is  a  war  against  the 
martial  spirit  that  lurks  inevitably  in  a 
purely  military  system  of  government.  The 
moral  issue — the  fight  against  the  assertion 
of  force  in  carrying  out  national  ambitions 
— involves  in  its  ultimate  triumph  the  re- 
moval of  the  causes  that  produce  wars. 

It  is  from  this  same  point  of  view  that  we 
must  approach  the  corollary  to  the  war,  the 
problem  of  peace  when  the  issue  shall  have 
been  won.  But  before  taking  this  up,  let 
us  consider  two  questions  that  confront  us 
when  we  turn  to  a  closer  analysis  of  the 
moral  issue.  What  is  the  basis  or  justifica- 
tion for  our  designating  the  fight  against 
the  domination  of  power  as  a  moral  conflict, 

7  See  an  article  "  A  Pacifist  Defense  of  America's 
War/'  by  Joseph  Jastrow,  in  The  North  American 
Review  for  August,  1917. 
59 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

and,  secondly,  how  was  it  possible  for  a  peo- 
ple of  great  achievements,  that  stands  out 
prominently  in  the  domain  of  intellectual 
activity,  a  people  with  a  great  literature  and 
a  long  list  of  thinkers,  a  people  full  of  senti- 
ment in  their  domestic  lives,  and  not  bellig- 
erent by  nature — how  was  it  possible  for 
them  to  become  involved  in  the  issue  which 
now  confronts  the  world? 

There  are  thinkers  of  recognized  eminence 
who  sincerely  believe  that  the  unfolding  of 
power  is  the  proper  goal  of  mankind,  sug- 
gested by  nature  in  which  power  seems  to 
be  a  controlling  force.  The  stronger  animal 
overcomes  the  weaker;  the  storm  sweeps 
along  and  brings  havoc  to  whatever  is  not 
strong  enough  to  resist  its  attack.  A  battle 
is  decided  ultimately  by  superior  strength, 
in  combination,  to  be  sure,  with  strategy, 
which,  however,  is  merely  the  means  of  using 
power  to  the  best  advantage.  Even  in  the 
domain  of  religion,  power  exercises  its  force. 
The  gods  in  primitive  and  in  many  advanced 

60 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

religions  of  antiquity  were  viewed  primarily 
as  embodiments  or  symbols  of  strength. 
Until  the  threshold  of  modern  times,  re- 
ligions were  spread  by  means  of  power. 
Islam  glorifies  the  sword  as  the  medium  of 
enforcing  the  Koran.  Intolerance  and  per- 
secution, which  fill  many  pages  in  the  history 
of  Christianity,  are  corollaries  to  the  recog- 
nition of  power  as  one  of  the  allies  of  re- 
ligion in  providing  for  the  spiritual  needs  of 
man.  In  ancient  Hebrew  and  in  many  other 
languages,  the  general  term  for  God  means 
"  the  strong  one."  One  of  the  common  titles 
in  the  Old  Testament  given  to  the  God  of 
the  Hebrews  was  "  The  Lord  of  Hosts,"  as 
the  leader  of  armies.  Nature  seems  to  pro- 
claim that  the  mighty  shall  inherit  the  world, 
and  history  often  appears  to  justify  the 
claim  that  to  the  victor  belongs  the  spoils. 

t)w  the  answer  to  all  this  is  simple.  If 
we  believe  that  man's  destiny  is  to  follow 
along  the  lines  mapped  out  by  nature,  there 
is  hardly  any  escape  from  the  philosophy,  so 

61 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

commonly  associated  with  Nietzsche,  that 
the  will  to  power  is  the  ultimate  goal  of  hu- 
manity, and  that  such  religions  as  Judaism, 
Christianity  and  Buddhism,  in  setting  up 
high  ethical  ideals  as  the  flowering  expres- 
sion of  religious  belief,  and  inculcating  the 
necessity  of  ethics  at  the  sacrifice  of  power 
and  of  victory,  run  counter  to  the  laws  of 
nature.  And  yet  Nietzsche  himself,  that 
profound  and  unhappy  thinker,  so  con- 
stantly upheld  as  the  advocate  of  might  over 
right,  furnishes  the  corrective  to  the  per- 
nicious doctrine.  A  thorough  student  and 
able  expounder  of  Nietzsche's  philosophy 
has,  in  a  recent  volume,8  set  forth  Nietzsche's 
"  superman "  in  its  correct  light.  The 
theory  of  the  "  superman  "  represents,  in  a 
measure,  the  climax  of  Nietzsche's  philoso- 
phy; but  the  superman  is  the  one  who  is 
supreme  because  he  has  conquered  power. 
He  stands  above  power,  he  is  beyond  good 

8  W.  M.  Salter,  "  Nietzsche,  The  Thinker  "  (New 
York,  1917),  Chapter  XXVII. 
62 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

and  evil,  because  he  dwells  in  a  world  in 
which  he  is  no  longer  engaged  in  a  struggle 
between  two  opposing  forces.  He  is 
triumphant  because  he  has  no  fear.  The 
superman  is  merely  the  symbol  of  the  highest 
perfection,  and  perfection  must  be  without 
weakness  as  well  as  without  fear.  The 
superman  represents  the  triumph  of  the 
ideal,  and  it  is  merely  the  fondness  of 
Nietzsche  for  paradox,  and  his  distaste  for 
cant,  hypocrisy  and  mawkish  sentimental- 
ism,  that  leads  him  to  suggest  the  identifica- 
tion of  his  idea  of  a  superman  with  power. 
Nietzsche  never  evolved  a  system  of  phi- 
losophy; he  merely  gave  utterance  to  spo- 
radic thoughts,  often  in  a  semi-mystic  guise. 
If  we  strip  his  philosophy  of  paradoxes  and 
inconsistencies — and  the  man  who  is  fond 
of  paradox  is  rarely  consistent — we  see  that 
in  its  essence  his  philosophy  recognizes  the 
inherent  opposition  between  the  course  of 
nature  and  the  course  of  civilization.  Civi- 
lization is   essentially   a   struggle   against 

63 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

nature.  Man's  impulse  towards  the  im- 
provement of  his  condition  brings  him  at 
every  turn  into  conflict  with  nature.  Human 
progress  is  the  triumph  of  man  over  the 
forces  of  nature  hostile  to  him  when  he  tries 
to  oppose  them.  Hence  as  man  advances, 
he  endows  his  gods  with  attributes  that  are 
contrary  to  nature.  These  gods  are  no 
longer  the  strong,  the  mighty  leaders  in  bat- 
tle. They  are  pictured  as  open  to  mercy, 
which  is  the  willingness  to  make  an  excep- 
tion to  inexorable  pitiless  law.  They  are 
viewed  as  open  to  pity,  which  involves  a 
modification  in  the  law.  The  quality  of  love 
is  attributed  to  them,  which  means  the  sub- 
stitution of  grace  for  law.  This  movement 
in  the  field  of  religion,  totally  changing  the 
character  of  the  old  nature  gods  by  giving 
them  attributes  that  are  not  found  in  nature, 
but  which  reflect  man's  own  ethical  advance 
in  opposing  nature — this  movement  culmi- 
nated in  the  strange  yet  impressive  doctrine 
of  God  himself  making  a  sacrifice  of  what 

64 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

was  dearest  to  him,  in  order  to  save  mankind 
from  eternal  damnation  through  the  force 
of  law,  which  demanded  that  sin  must  be 
followed  by  punishment  and  cannot  be 
wiped  out.  The  natural  condition  thus  be- 
comes reversed,  as  man  proceeds  in  his  up- 
ward course.  All  those  forces  which  stand 
opposed  to  power — and  nature  is  the  very 
synonym  of  power — are  moved  into  the  fore- 
ground. Progress  is  the  challenge  thrown 
down  to  nature  viewed  as  power,  the  strug- 
gle against  forces  symbolizing  might,  and 
which,  therefore,  from  this  point  of  view  be- 
come forces  of  evil. 

It  has  always  seemed  to  me,  in  my  studies 
of  the  religious  evolution  of  mankind,  that 
in  one  respect  at  least  the  religion  founded 
by  Zoroaster,  in  the  sixth  century  before 
our  era,  penetrated  more  deeply  into  the 
mystery  of  the  struggle  of  man  against 
nature  than  any  other,  by  positing  two 
forces  in  control  of  the  world,  a  power  of 
good,  and  a  power  of  evil.     The  power  of 

5  65 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

good  was  Ahuramazda,  the  "  resplendent  in 
light  " ;  the  power  of  evil  was  Ahriman,  the 
"  dark."  Zoroaster,  in  reaching  out  to  a 
conception  of  divine  government  of  the  uni- 
verse, logically  and  in  a  humane  spirit,  as- 
sumed that  the  supreme  god,  ruling  his 
creatures  by  love,  justice  and  mercy,  could 
not  be  held  responsible  for  the  evil,  the  in- 
justice and  the  suffering  in  this  world;  and 
so  Zoroaster  boldly  proclaimed  that  Ahura- 
mazda, the  highest  and  good  god,  possesses 
all  attributes  except  one.  Ahuramazda  was 
omniscient — but  not  all  powerful.  The 
forces  of  evil  were  under  the  control  of  an 
independent  power  which  he  called  Ahri- 
man. With  this  power  Ahuramazda  was 
represented  as  being  in  constant  conflict, 
in  the  hope  that  eventually,  after  aeons  upon 
aeons,  the  good  will  overcome  the  evil  and 
become  also  all  powerful  as  well  as  omnis- 
cient. It  is  not  accidental  that  Nietzsche, 
attracted  by  this  doctrine,  chose  to  put 
some  of  his  finest  thoughts  into  the  mouth 

66 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

of  Zoroaster  in  the  volume  which  he  en- 
titled, "  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra."  When 
Nietzsche,  therefore,  makes  Zoroaster 
preach  the  superman,  it  is  the  Super-God, 
the  god  who  has  overcome  evil,  that  Niet- 
zsche has  in  mind.  Human  history  is  the 
struggle  of  Ahuramazda  against  Ahriman 
— the  higher  forces  in  deadly  conflict  with 
the  forces  of  evil.  Nature,  in  so  far  as  it 
symbolizes  power,  represents  Ahriman ;  and 
civilization,  in  so  far  as  it  aims  to  establish 
a  higher  principle  in  the  world  in  place  of 
power,  is  Ahuramazda. 

V 

Militarism,  the  very  embodiment  of 
power,  making  its  appeal  to  power,  and 
knowing  no  other  weapon  than  power,  thus 
becomes  an  evil  force  fatal  to  progress,  as  it  is 
hostile  to  humanitarianism.  The  unfolding 
of  civilization  resolves  itself  into  a  process 
of  substituting  for  power  a  factor  of  a  higher 
order,  one  destined  eventually  to  overcome 

67 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

power.  And  yet  here  is  the  ugly  fact  that 
as  nations  grow — and  growth  is  necessary 
to  a  people — they  also  grow  in  power.  The 
tendency  is  towards  expansion,  towards  an 
extension  of  power  in  one  direction  or  the 
other.  What,  then,  is  the  safeguard  against 
the  abuse  of  power  ?  How  can  the  ambitions 
of  a  nation  be  kept  within  bounds  so  as  to 
avoid  the  danger  of  an  alliance  with  power 
as  the  chief,  or,  worse  still,  as  the  sole  means 
to  carry  out  these  ambitions  ?  The  examples 
of  Rome  and  Germany  point  the  way  along 
which  danger  lies,  and  they  also  point  the 
way  out.  Power  in  the  control  of  a  group, 
holding  the  people  in  its  grasp  by  means  of 
military  machinery,  leads  on  the  one  hand 
to  the  principle  of  government  over  a  people 
and  to  issues  against  which  sooner  or  later 
the  moral  conscience  of  mankind  rises  in 
protest  and  opposition;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  such  a  group  ruling  by  power  will 
necessarily  be  led  to  make  a  military  system 
its  main  support  in  carrying  out  a  national 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

policy.  The  two  aspects  of  power,  power 
over  a  people  and  power  as  the  ally  of  na- 
tional life,  go  hand  in  hand.  These  two 
aspects  combined  produce  the  menace  that 
eventually  forces  the  world  to  arm. 

The  fight  against  power  is  always  a  moral 
issue,  and  the  triumph  over  power  a  moral 
victory.  A  menace,  to  be  sure,  may  also 
arise  when  the  power  is  conferred  upon  a 
group  by  a  whole  people.  A  nation,  ruling 
its  own  destinies,  may  be  bitten  by  the  mili- 
taristic spirit  of  domination  or  conquest, 
but  the  danger  is  far  less  likely  to  arise. 
The  saner  and  finer  instincts  in  a  nation  will 
be  apt  to  assert  themselves  against  such  an 
immoral  alliance  between  power  and  na- 
tional policies.  The  moral  sense  of  the 
masses  will  rebel  against  the  temptation  to 
ride  rough-shod  over  the  claims  of  sister 
nations.  The  feelings  of  a  common  human- 
ity are  more  likely  to  manifest  themselves 
and  to  bring  about  a  counter  movement  to  a 
course,  which  the  more  far-sighted  leaders  in 

69 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

the  nation  will  see  to  be  driving  a  people  to 
its  own  undoing,  by  arousing  first  the  sus- 
picion, then  the  distrust,  and  finally  the  hos- 
tility of  the  world.  The  road  along  which 
danger  lies  is  more  likely  to  be  avoided  before 
it  is  too  late,  and  at  all  events  the  people 
have  it  in  their  hands  to  call  a  halt  when  the 
danger  becomes  apparent.  But  with  power 
in  the  control  of  a  group,  using  its  power 
to  maintain  its  hold  over  a  people,  bringing 
about  a  system  of  government  that  is  im- 
posed upon  a  people  and  that  does  not  re- 
ceive its  mandate  from  them — under  such 
circumstances,  the  legitimate  bounds  to  the 
extension  of  a  people's  power  will  by  the 
logical  force  of  events  be  overstepped.  The 
people  are  powerless,  and  it  is  only  a  ques- 
tion of  time  before  the  combination  of 
power  with  national  policy  will  lead  to  a 
menace  in  which  the  essential  issue  will  al- 
ways be  found  to  be  a  moral  one. 

It  is  worthy  of  note,   also,  that  those 

periods  in  human  history  in  which  power  is 
70 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

invoked  as  the  main  support  for  carrying  out 
national  ambitions  are  not  the  ones  marked 
by  the  best  or  the  highest  of  human  achieve- 
ments. Rome  was  at  her  intellectual  height 
before  she  entered  upon  the  ruthless  course 
of  conquest  and  domination  in  Csesar's  days, 
despite  the  glamor  that  her  success  in  arms 
threw  over  her  widely  extended  dominions. 
Egypt  produced  her  best  works  of  art  and 
literature  before  the  extension  of  her  domin- 
ions into  Asia;  and  Assyria,  the  greatest 
military  power  of  antiquity,  was  not  a  cul- 
tural force.  Napoleon's  regime  led  to  a  de- 
cline in  France's  prestige — fortunately  only 
of  a  temporary  character.  It  certainly  can- 
not be  said  that  the  Germany  after  1888 
is  greater  in  its  intellectual  achievements 
than  the  old  Germany.  George  Brandes, 
whom  I  have  quoted,  comments  sadly  on  the 
fact  that  a  decline  in  liberal  thought  set  in 
in  Germany  after  the  union  of  German 
States  in  1870.  "  The  old  men  of  this  gen- 
eration,"  says   Brandes,   "  are  the  young 

71 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

spirits,  inspired  with  high  ideals,  while  the 
young  men  have  linked  themselves  largely 
to  reactionary  ideas."  Material  prosperity 
and  the  growth  of  the  political  power  of 
Germany  during  the  past  quarter  of  a  cen- 
tury have  not  produced  as  many  great 
names,  either  in  literature,  in  philosophy  or 
even  in  scholarship,  as  the  period  before 
1870.  The  great  era  of  philosophy  in  Ger- 
many set  in  with  Kant,  who  appears  at  a 
time  when  there  was  no  thought  of  a  greater 
Germany.  Goethe  and  Schiller  flourished 
at  a  time  when  the  German  people  lived 
under  the  shadow  of  Napoleonic  domination, 
and  Heine,  the  poet  of  freedom,  sings  his 
immortal  songs  while  the  people  were  strug- 
gling for  independence.  Warnings  against 
the  dangers  inherent  in  the  building  up  of 
a  great  military  machine  have  been  raised 
in  Germany  itself  during  the  past  two  de- 
cades. The  burden  of  Maximilian  Hardens 
messages  in  his  periodical,  Die  Zukunft, 
has  been  a  steady  protest  against  the  po- 

72 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

<< 
litical  road  along  which  Germany  has  been 

travelling  since  the  accession  of  the  present 
emperor.  About  ten  years  ago  a  novel  ap- 
peared in  Germany  which  created  a  pro- 
found impression  and  was  most  widely  read. 
Its  title  was,  "  Jena  or  Sedan,"  arid  it  boldly 
raised  the  question,  which  was  better  for 
Germany,  the  defeat  at  Jena  or  the  victory 
of  Sedan.  The  entire  aim  of  the  novel  was 
to  show  the  disintegrating  effect  of  mili- 
tarism on  the  ideals  of  the  country  and 
as  exemplified  within  the  ranks  of  the  army 
itself.  Many  of  the  dramas  produced  in 
Germany  during  the  decade  preceding  the 
war  dealt  with  problems  arising  out  of  the 
military  system;  and  the  problems  were  in- 
variably of  a  tragic  character  that  revealed 
the  purpose  of  the  author  to  show  the  harsh- 
ness and  brutality  of  the  system. 

Such  facts  enable  us  to  understand  how 
it  was  possible  that  a  nation  that  in  every 
other  respect,  except  in  the  supremacy  of 
the  militaristic  spirit,  stands  for  progress, 

73 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

should  have  been  led,  by  the  subtle  influence 
of  a  military  domination  over  the  life  of  the 
people,  to  become  chained  to  power  as  the 
strongest  aid  in  carrying  out  the  national 
aims.  Therein  lies  Germany's  fatal  error, 
her  sin  against  the  moral  law  which  presides 
over  mankind's  efforts  to  overcome  the  hos- 
tile forces  of  nature.  The  alliance  between 
militarism  and  civilization  is  an  unholy  one. 
It  forms  a  parallel  to  the  combination  of  the 
Sword  with  the  Koran  as  the  means  of  prop- 
agating Islam,  and  which  has  similarly  been 
the  fatal  moral  error  of  that  great  religion. 
The  combination  of  power  with  national 
aims  means  employing  Ahriman,  the  power 
of  evil,  to  bring  about  the  triumph  of  Ahura- 
mazda,  the  force  making  for  betterment  and 
for  moral  growth. 

It  is  precisely  this  unfortunate  combina- 
tion that  has  prevented  Germany  from  pass- 
ing, as  all  other  nations  have  passed,  from 
the  principle  of  government  over  a  people 
to  that  of  government  by  a  people.  A  mili- 
tary system  of  government  arises  either  as 

74 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

the  expression  of  autocracy  and  becomes  the 
means  of  perpetuating  autocracy,  or  the  sys- 
tem leads  to  autocracy.  There  are  examples 
for  both  processes  in  human  history.  In  the 
case  of  Germany,  autocracy  created  the  sys- 
tem. In  the  case  of  Rome,  the  system  led  to 
autocracy.  The  result,  however,  is  in  both 
cases  the  same.  We  obtain,  as  the  theory 
of  the  State,  government  over  the  people 
instead  of  government  by  the  people. 

VI 

The  moral  issue  involved  in  the  war  is 
accentuated  by  the  strange  fact  that  Ger- 
many, alone  of  modern  nations,  has  not 
realized  the  trend  of  modern  history  since 
the  close  of  the  18th  century.  She  has  not 
heeded  the  message  which  rang  out  clearly 
when  the  shot  was  fired  at  Lexington 
"  heard  round  the  world."  That  volley 
sounded  the  death-knell  of  the  old  system 
which  set  up  as  its  principle  that  govern- 
ment exists  for  the  development  of  power 
and  for  controlling  a  people  by  the  aid  of 

75 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

that  power.  It  proclaimed  the  new  prin- 
ciple, that  the  State  was  not  an  abstract 
symbol  of  power,  but  a  concrete  expression 
of  the  will  of  the  people,  and  that  national 
policies  are  to  be  developed  and  carried  out 
by  the  sovereign  will  of  the  people,  not  by 
a  group  acting  autocratically  on  behalf  of 
the  people.  The  French  Revolution  is  the 
echo  of  the  American  War  for  Independ- 
ence and  established  the  same  principle  of 
government  through  the  people  for  the 
guidance  of  Europe.  Napoleon's  armies 
carried  the  message  to  Italy,  to  Germany, 
to  Austria,  to  Russia,  and  to  the  East.  The 
revolution  of  1848  in  Germany,  the  estab- 
lishment of  Italian  independence  in  1859, 
the  Turkish  revolution  of  1907  and  the  Rus- 
sian revolution  of  1917  are  landmarks  in 
this  onward  sweep  of  popular  government. 
Germany  started,  indeed,  bravely  and  nobly 
on  her  own  struggle  for  independence  early 
in  the  nineteenth  century,  when,  largely 
through  the  enthusiasm  of  the  students  at 
her  universities,  the  popular  uprising  took 

76 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

place  which  succeeded  in  freeing  Germany 
from  the  Napoleonic  yoke.  It  is  significant 
that  the  ruler  of  Germany  at  the  time,  Fred- 
erick William  III,  and  his  advisers  were 
lukewarm  towards  the  movement,  for  as  rep- 
resentatives of  the  old  system  they  instinc- 
tively realized  that  the  liberation  of  Ger- 
many by  the  people  might  lead  to  the  further 
attempt  to  liberate  Germany  also  from  the 
yoke  of  autocratic  rule.  Accordingly,  after 
the  Napoleonic  wars  were  over,  the  states- 
men and  military  leaders  of  Germany  de- 
vised the  present  military  system  which 
brought  the  army  under  complete  subjec- 
tion to  the  government,  to  be  used  by  that 
government  for  the  perpetuation  of  the  old 
system  of  government  over  the  people. 

It  is  a  sad  outcome  indeed  of  a  struggle 
for  independence  that  the  people  themselves 
should  have  forged  the  chains  that  bound 
them  to  the  will  of  an  autocratic  ruler,  so 
that  when  the  year  1848  came  around  the 
masses  snapped  at  the  chains  but  could  not 
break  them.     Some  steps,  to  be  sure,  were 

77 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

taken  towards  the  democratization  of  the 
government.  Constitutions  were  grudg- 
ingly granted,  which  accorded  a  certain 
measure  of  popular  control,  but  the  basic 
principle  of  autocracy  was  unchanged. 
With  the  army  under  their  complete  control, 
the  rulers  of  the  German  States  could  adapt 
themselves  to  the  new  order  without  forfeit- 
ing the  essence  of  their  authority.  This  was 
notably  the  case  in  Prussia,  the  largest  and 
most  powerful  of  the  German  States,  which 
gradually  secured  and  maintained  a  su- 
premacy over  the  others.  The  union  of  the 
German  States  after  the  war  with  France 
into  the  present  German  Empire  has  fur- 
ther increased  the  domination  of  Prussia, 
and  this  despite  sporadic  symptoms  of  oppo- 
sition, particularly  on  the  part  of  the  states 
of  South  Germany. 

The  government  took  advantage  of  the 
strong  national  patriotism  of  the  Germans, 
kept  alive  through  the  memory  of  the  older 
struggle  for  independence,  and  intensified 
by  the  enthusiasm  created  through  the  estab- 

78 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

lishment  of  a  powerful  united  German 
Empire,  to  further  secure  its  hold  over  the 
people.  It  did  so  in  a  clever,  and,  on  the 
surface  at  least,  beneficent  manner.  It 
sought  to  smother  rising  discontent  by  pro- 
viding in  most  efficient  fashion  for  the  needs 
of  the  masses.  It  introduced  legislation  for 
the  protection  of  labor  laws,  which  aimed 
to  safeguard  the  health  of  workingmen  and 
to  secure  them  against  the  tyranny  of 
capital ;  and  it  promoted  and  encouraged  in- 
dustrial and  commercial  expansion  through- 
out the  country.  But  at  the  same  time  the 
government  in  an  equally  systematic  and 
efficient  fashion  built  up  the  most  powerful 
military  machine  that  the  world  has  ever 
seen,  and  which  has  served  a  double  purpose : 
to  keep  the  people  under  complete  control, 
and  to  create  precisely  the  power  which  a 
military  system  regards  as  its  main  support 
in  carrying  out  national  ambitions.  The 
German  military  system  sets  its  face  reso- 
lutely against  the  abandonment  of  the  old 
principle  of  autocracy,  which  assumes  that 

79 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

government  is  vested  by  divine  providence 
in  the  hands  of  the  ruler.  The  military  gov- 
ernment of  Germany  is  a  restraining  force, 
granting  the  minimum  of  self-government 
to  the  people,  making  concessions  only  to 
popular  movements  for  democracy  when 
forced  by  circumstances  to  do  so,  and  deter- 
mined not  to  let  go  its  grasp  on  the  people. 
It  seeks  the  perpetuation  of  its  power  over 
the  people.  The  German  government  rested 
as  strongly  in  1914  as  in  1848  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  government  was  to  be  over  the 
people,  not  by  the  people ;  and  so,  as  a  logi- 
cal consequence,  all  national  policies  are  not 
only  in  the  hands  of  the  government,  but  are 
guided  by  the  small  group  which  the  rulers 
of  the  people  of  Germany  call  to  their  aid, 
and  who  are  responsible  to  the  head  of  the 
government,  and  not  to  the  people.  The 
government  rules  the  people  by  the  help  of 
the  army.  Therein  lies  the  crux  of  the  situa- 
tion. In  all  other  countries  of  Europe  the 
army  forms  the  body  of  defense  for  the  coun- 
try ;  in  Germany  the  army  is  the  ally  of  the 

80 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

government — its  right  hand — without  which 
it  would  be  powerless  to  enforce  its  will. 

The  combination  of  the  government  with 
the  army  necessarily  leads  to  the  enthrone- 
ment of  the  militaristic  spirit.  An  army  is 
a  symbol  of  power,  of  sheer  material 
strength,  and  the  government  that  employs 
the  army  as  the  agency  of  maintaining  its 
hold  over  the  people  creates  the  moral  issue 
involved  in  the  war,  and  which  we  may  now 
more  specifically  define  as  the  determination 
to  divorce  national  policies  from  power  as 
the  means  of  carrying  them  out. 

VII 

A  further  natural  and  disastrous  result 
of  a  background  of  militarism  to  the  national 
policy  of  a  people — and  one  that  is  likewise 
closely  bound  up  in  the  moral  issue  of  the 
war — is  the  creation  of  a  theory  of  state- 
craft to  fit  in  with  existing  conditions.  That 
theory  further  clarifies  the  moral  issue.  The 
theorist  is  not  infrequently  the  man  who  is 
led  to  justify  the  status  quo  by  showing  that 
it  is  in  accord  with  logic.    Your  theorist  did 

6  81 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

not  fail  to  put  in  an  appearance  in  Germany. 
Philosophers,  historians,  theologians,  econo- 
mists and  natural  scientists,  in  concert,  sup- 
plied the  framework  for  the  ideal  of  the 
State  as  the  highest  expression  of  the  na- 
tional unit.  The  aim  of  the  State  was 
predicated  as  the  acquirement  of  power.  It 
has  been  customary  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  to  associate  the  spread  of  this  theory  in 
Germany  with  the  influence  exerted  by 
Treitschke,  the  Prussian  historian,  and  to 
regard  Nietzsche  as  the  exponent  of  the 
system  on  its  philosophical  side,  and  Bern- 
hardi  as  the  one  who  illustrates  it  from  the 
military  point  of  view.  Treitschke,  how- 
ever, is  merely  an  exponent  of  a  theory  of 
government  already  in  full  force  when  he 
leaped  into  fame.  He  is  not  in  any  sense  the 
originator  of  a  theory  of  statecraft.  He  sets 
the  stamp  of  approval  upon  a  system  that 
had  been  evolved  by  the  military  rulers 
since  the  early  decades  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, and  tries  to  justify  it  by  providing  a 
theory  that  will  fit  in  with  the  facts.    For 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

many  of  his  views,  emphasizing  a  militaristic 
background  as  essential  to  a  powerful  state, 
he  harks  back  to  a  far  greater,  though  also 
more  cruel  thinker,  Clausewitz,  the  military- 
writer  whose  elaborate  work  on  "  War,"  9 
in  part  philosophical,  in  part  strategical, 
was  of  fundamental  importance  in  the  devel- 
opment of  a  system  of  military  government 
in  Prussia,  and,  later  on,  throughout  all  Ger- 
many. Treitschke's  influence  was  profound 
during  his  lifetime  because  he  interpreted 
the  spirit  that  set  in  in  Germany  after  1870, 
with  its  insistence  upon  the  superiority  of 
everything  Teutonic  as  the  basis  of  the 
strength  of  the  people.  It  was  that  over- 
emphasis on  nationalism,  interpreted  in 
terms  of  victory,  achieved  in  the  three  wars 
of  1864,  1866  and  1870,  which  spelt  power 
as  the  ally  of  the  State  and  which  led  to  the 

9  Not  published  till  1832,  the  year  after  Clause- 
witz's  death.  The  last  edition  of  the  English  trans- 
lation in  three  volumes,  by  J.  J.  Graham,  with  an 
introduction  by  Colonel  Maude,  appeared  in  1911 
(London). 

83 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

theory  of  the  State  as  the  highest  expression 
of  power. 

Similarly,  the  philosophy  of  Nietzsche 
in  some  of  its  aspects  (but  not  in  all)  fitted 
in  with  the  actual  conditions  that  prevailed 
after  the  '80 's  in  Germany,  but  it  is  erro- 
neous to  suppose  that  the  militaristic  spirit 
was  guided  by  a  thinker  who  was  neglected 
until  a  few  years  before  his  death,  and  whose 
influence  became  a  factor  in  the  national 
life  only  after  the  nation  had  been  thor- 
oughly drilled  through  the  system  itself.10 
It  was  said  of  a  certain  philosopher  that  he 

10  Our  Ex- Ambassador  to  Germany,  James  W. 
Gerard,  in  his  new  book,  "  Face  to  Face  with  Kaiser- 
ism,"  has  some  suggestive  remarks  on  this  subject 
confirming  the  view  here  taken,  and  showing  how 
absurd  it  is  to  assume  that  the  military  chiefs  of 
Germany  sat  up  nights  reading  Nietzsche  in  order 
to  steep  themselves  in  his  theories.  Mr.  Gerard  also 
shows  that  a  propagandist  work,  embodying  the 
plans  and  methods  of  the  German  military  party,  by 
Otto  Richard  Tannenberg,  Gross-Deutschland,  was 
of  far  greater  importance  than  the  much  quoted 
Bernhardi,  whose  writings  are  to  be  regarded  as  a 
symptom  of  existing  conditions,  rather  than  as  having 
any  great  influence  in  bringing  about  those  conditions. 
84 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

had  been  understood  by  only  one  of  his  dis- 
ciples, and  that  that  one  had  misunderstood 
him.  One  wonders  what  Nietzsche,  who  had 
little  sympathy  for  the  trend  of  modern 
Germany,11  would  say  if  he  were  alive  to 
witness  the  enthronement  of  his  "  Super- 
man," in  the  person  of  the  present  Emperor, 
as  the  highest  symbol  of  the  power  of  the 
State.  What  would  he  say  of  his  superman, 
who  overcomes  power,  pictured  as  the  em- 
bodiment  of  power?  But  the  Nietzschean 
philosophy,  it  must  be  admitted,  can  be  in- 
terpreted as  the  prophecy  of  a  triumphant 
military  system,  founded  on  the  theory  of 
the  sovereignty  of  the  State,  and  indepen- 
dent of  the  desires  of  those  who  form  the 
State.  It  has  been  so  read  in  order  to  pro- 
vide a  theory  that  will  fit  in  with  the  facts, 
not  to  explain,  but  to  justify  existing  condi- 
tions.   The  pamphleteers  of  Pan-German- 

11  While  preparing  his  work  on  "  The  Will  to 
Power,"  he  expressed  the  wish  that  it  might  be  writ- 
ten in  French,  so  as  not  to  appear  to  give  counte- 
nance to  German  imperial  aspirations.  (Salter, 
"  Nietzsche,  The  Thinker,"  p.  357.) 
85 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

ism  followed  along  the  same  lines  of  glori- 
fying the  growth  of  Germany's  power  by 
providing  a  theoretical  substratum  of  an 
economic  character.12  Historians,  theolo- 
gians, and  scientists  joined  to  swell  the 
chorus,  particularly  since  the  outbreak  of 
the  war,  all  caught  by  the  temptation  to 
justify  the  things  that  are,  by  endorsing  the 
theory  of  the  State  that  crushes  the  expres- 
sion of  the  popular  will.13  It  is  indeed  de- 
pressing to  see  the  galaxy  of  university 
teachers  and  the  exponents  of  religion  in  the 
pulpit  unite  to  glorify  the  mailed  fist  of  an 

12  See,  for  example,  the  work  of  S.  Grumbach, 
"  Germany's  Annexation  Aims,"  which  is  a  most  re- 
markable collection  of  documents  and  statements  that 
have  appeared  in  Germany  since  the  4th  of  August, 
1914,  from  government  officials,  statesmen,  his- 
torians, economists,  etc.  (Translated  by  E.  Barker, 
New  York,  1917.) 

13  See  the  collection  of  utterances  of  men  of  learn- 
ing, as  well  as  others,  in  the  volume  entitled  "  Out 
of  Their  Own  Mouths"  (New  York,  1917).  The 
collection  is  all  the  more  noteworthy  because  the 
compiler,  in  a  fair  spirit,  adds  also  in  the  concluding 
chapter,  protests  on  the  part  of  Germans  against 
the  ambitions  and  methods  of  the  present  government. 

86 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

ambitious  and  restless  ruler,  who  represents 
in  his  person  a  mediaeval  conception  of  su- 
preme authority  confirmed  by  divine  sanc- 
tion, der  Allerhoechste! — a  title  higher  than 
that  given  to  the  Almighty  Himself. 

The  highest  aim  of  the  State  is  thus  predi- 
cated as  the  acquirement  of  power.  We 
must  beware,  indeed,  of  making  the  error 
of  assuming  that  this  theory,  though  per- 
nicious in  its  ultimate  analysis,  is  entirely 
without  warrant.  There  are  phases  of  this 
aspect  of  the  State  which  we  can  well  afford 
to  consider  in  reaching  a  worthier  concep- 
tion. The  State  has  a  right  to  make  de- 
mands of  its  citizens  in  the  common  interest, 
and  even  to  ask  them  to  endure  sacrifices. 
But  the  theory  becomes  insidious  when  it  is 
used  as  a  weapon  in  the  hands  of  a  group 
for  the  purpose  of  developing  power  in  two 
directions,  as  the  means  on  the  one  hand  of 
controlling  a  people,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
as  a  means  of  carrying  out  national  policies. 
Patriotism  does  not  spell  blind  obedience  to 
the  aims  of  the  State  as  defined  by  a  group 

87 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

seeking  self-perpetuation  as  its  own  end. 
The  deeper  patriotism,  resting  on  the  popu- 
lar will,  seeks  to  direct  the  aims  of  the  State 
into  the  right  direction.  In  a  government 
that  is  carried  on  by  the  sovereign  will  of  the 
people,  the  ideals  and  aspirations  of  the 
people  are,  under  normal  conditions,  carried 
out  by  virtue  of  their  inherent  force,  and  not 
by  the  appeal  to  force  or  by  the  threat  of  a 
military  machine. 

It  is  not  accidental  that  biology  was  ap- 
pealed to  in  further  support  both  of  the 
theory  that  power  was  the  proper  goal  of 
the  nation,  and  of  war  as  the  logical  means 
of  carrying  out  the  policies  of  a  nation. 
The  biological  argument  for  war — that  it 
corresponds  to  a  law  of  nature  to  which  man- 
kind as  part  of  creation  is  subject — can  be 
used  with  potent  effect  for  upholding  a  mili- 
tary system;  and  it  has  been  so  used  by 
writers  in  Germany  and  elsewhere,  whose 
frankness  and  boldness  constitute  the  only 
redeeming  feature  of  the  horrible  picture  of 
incessant  strife  that  these  writers  unfold  as 

88 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

the  natural  destiny  of  mankind.  The  bio- 
logical argument  for  war,  as  also  the  theory 
that  the  goal  of  the  State  is  to  acquire  power, 
ignores  the  inherent  contrast  between  the 
natural  drift  of  things  and  the  conscious  di- 
rection of  civilization,  which  is  revolt  against 
natural  law.  Power  and  civilization  are  not 
allies,  but  hostile  rivals.  They  represent  the 
opposition  between  Ahriman  and  Ahura- 
mazda.  Civilization  means  the  gradual 
elimination  of  mere  brute  force  as  the 
weapon  to  carry  out  man's  destiny.  Civi- 
lization brings  to  the  front  factors,  such  as 
consideration  for  the  physically  weak,  the 
elements  of  love  and  pity,  that  are  incom- 
patible with  the  domination  of  mere  power. 
We  owe  to  Heine  what  is  perhaps  the  most 
vivid  picture  of  what  happens  to  a  civiliza- 
tion when  it  neglects  the  recognition  of  the 
factors  that  represent  the  triumph  over 
power,  and  when  ruthless  power  is  placed 
at  the  service  of  civilization.  At  the  close 
of  his  brilliant  and  still  valuable  treatise  on 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

"  Religion  and  Philosophy  in  Germany,"  14 
Heine,  writing  at  a  time  when  the  creation 
of  a  strong  military  system  in  Germany  had 
already  begun  to  color  the  trend  of  philo- 
sophical thought  and  to  uncover  the  dangers 
inherent  in  such  a  system,  reveals  with  al- 
most prophetic  insight  a  glimpse  of  the  time 
when  the  theories  of  the  philosophers,15  used 

14  Written  originally  for  the  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes.  The  passage,  here  quoted,  is  significantly 
used  as  the  motto  for  a  series  of  French  documents 
illustrative  of  the  war,  and  published  by  a  French 
Catholic  organization. 

15  As  a  supplement  to  Heine,  one  should  read 
John  Dewey's  brilliant  and  penetrating  "  German 
Philosophy  and  Politics  "  (New  York,  1915),  which 
illustrates  the  manner  in  which  the  systems  of 
thought  produced  by  patriotic  idealists  issue  into 
a  glorification  of  unbridled  power  to  carry  out  the 
aims  of  the  State,  even  at  the  cost  of  morality  and 
of  the  enslavement  of  the  people.  In  this  way  it 
happens  that  even  Kant's  "  Categorical  Imperative  " 
can  be  appealed  to  by  the  Emperor  in  support  of 
his  position,  though  Kant  assuredly  meant  something 
different  by  his  impressive  thought  that  the  call  to 
duty  without  ulterior  divine  sanction  is  the  highest 
expression  of  man's  capacity  to  work  out  his  ultimate 
destiny. 

90 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

to  support  the  aims  of  the  State  as  the  em- 
bodiment of  power,  will  be  transformed  into 
action,  with  the  result  of  bringing  into  play 
the  demoniac  powers  of  the  old  Germanic 
gods,  when  forces  will  be  loosened  that  will 
sweep  with  blind  fury  over  the  world.  He 
sees  the  old  gods  of  the  Teutons  rising  up, 
"  rubbing  the  dust  of  a  thousand  years  out 
of  their  eyes,  led  by  Thor,  leaping  forth 
with  his  mighty  hammer  to  shatter  Gothic 
cathedrals."  The  savagery  of  war,  Heine 
predicts,  will  be  unfurled  in  all  the  titanic 
rage,  of  which  the  old  Norse  poets  sang. 
One  fancies  as  one  reads  these  predictions 
that  Heine  is  speaking  directly  to  us — and 
it  is  also  significant  that  for  Heine  this  day 
of  wrath,  which  he  sees  coming,  is  the  pre- 
cursor to  the  final  struggle  in  Germany  for 
the  liberation  from  the  military  and  auto- 
cratic yoke.  In  this  respect,  too,  he  may 
turn  out  to  be  guided  by  prophetic  instinct. 
But  for  us  the  chief  interest  in  the  picture 
that  he  draws  is  the  help  that  it  affords  in 
understanding  the  transformation  that  Ger- 

91 


THE  WAR  AS  A  MORAL  ISSUE 

many  has  undergone  under  the  influence  of 
the  creation  of  a  military  system  of  mon- 
strous proportions,  made  attractive  to  the 
people  through  its  justification  by  intel- 
lectual leaders,  providing  the  theory  to  sub- 
stantiate the  facts. 

The  combination  of  the  factors  that  I 
have  thus  tried  to  indicate  has  brought  about 
the  present  situation  in  which  the  civilized 
world  has  been  forced  to  unite  for  the  pro- 
tection of  humanity.  The  moral  issue  can- 
not be  won  until  the  liberal  elements  in  Ger- 
many, which  are  engaged  in  the  same  strug- 
gle, shall  have  acquired  the  power  to  sweep 
the  pernicious  system  out  of  existence,  or 
until  by  a  decisive  defeat  the  present  ruling 
forces  in  Germany  shall  meet  their  merited 
doom.  There  is  no  half-way  victory  in  the 
case  of  a  moral  issue.  It  must  be  carried  on 
to  a  complete  triumph.  The  rattling  of  the 
sabre  is  the  voice  of  Ahriman,  the  power  that 
makes  for  evil.  It  sounds  as  a  challenge  to 
all  mankind  to  come  to  the  rescue. 

92 


PART  II 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

"  Above    all    Nations    is    Humanity/' 

Goldwin  Smith. 

I 

It  is  from  the  point  of  view  suggested  by 
the  moral  issue  that  we  should  approach  the 
problem  of  peace,  to  which,  even  during  the 
conflict,  our  thoughts  should  be  directed. 
Not,  indeed,  in  the  sense  of  detailing  what 
the  terms  of  peace  are  to  be,  but  to  clarify 
our  minds  as  to  what  we  mean  by  peace, 
and  the  kind  of  peace  to  which  we  may  look 
forward.  So  far  as  terms  of  peace  are  con- 
cerned, it  is  presumptuous,  as  well  as  un- 
wise, for  the  ordinary  individual  to  discuss 
them — especially  at  the  present  juncture. 
The  problems  involved  in  peace  terms  are 
so  intricate  that  they  can  be  grasped  only 
by  those  whose  entire  attention  is  directed 
towards  statecraft.  There  are  scarcely  more 
than  a  dozen  individuals  in  the  world  whose 

95 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

opinions  on  the  terms  of  peace  would  have 
the  slightest  value.  This  phase  of  the  sub- 
ject must  be  left  to  those  who  can  speak  in 
official  language.  But  the  general  ques- 
tion of  the  kind  of  peace  that  the  world 
needs,  comes  well  within  the  scope  of  a  dis- 
cussion that  forms  a  natural  corollary  to  a 
consideration  of  the  moral  issue  involved  in 
the  war.  Moreover,  the  discussion  of  the 
general  problem  of  peace  is  essential  in  the 
midst  of  the  conflict  for  the  purpose  of 
creating  an  intelligent  public  opinion  that 
will  be  prepared  to  assert  itself  when  the 
time  for  peace  negotiations  arrives.  A  war 
like  the  present  demands  that  upon  the 
triumph  of  the  moral  issue  involved,  those 
who  will  be  called  upon  to  act  for  the  nations 
now  shedding  their  blood  in  such  profusion 
and  who  in  diverse  ways  are  enduring  a 
martyrdom   for  a  sacred  cause,1    will  be 

1  "  A  liberal  civilization  ascending  its  Calvary  " — 
as  Mr.  James  M.  Beck,  in  a  recent  address  ("  The 
Peril  of  Premature  Peace  Parleys,"  p.  18),  vividly 
puts  the  tragic  situation. 

96 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

guided  by  public  opinion  and  not  merely  by 
the  dictates  of  their  own  individual  judg- 
ment. It  is  essential  that  the  terms  of 
peace  reflect  that  opinion.  There  is  per- 
haps little  danger  of  these  terms  being 
drawn  up  in  the  interest  of  any  particular 
class,  but  there  is  always  a  danger  at  the 
close  of  a  war,  on  the  part  of  those  sitting 
round  the  conference  table,  of  overlooking 
the  main  issue,  through  the  failure  of  the 
crystallisation  of  public  opinion  in  regard 
to  that  issue.  The  fundamental  objection 
to  what  goes  under  the  name  of  a  "  German 
Peace  "  is  that  all  proposals  emanating  up 
to  the  present,  directly  or  indirectly,  from 
the  German  government  ignore  the  moral 
issue.  There  is  not  the  slightest  attempt 
made  even  to  recognize  its  existence,  much 
less  to  meet  it.  The  German  government 
has  not  as  yet  given  the  slightest  hint  of 
being  conscious  of  the  crime  committed 
against  civilization  by  the  ravaging  of  Bel- 
gium, which  had  no  share  in  the  immediate 

7  97 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

causes  that  led  to  the  war.  If  it  be  true  that 
the  German  people,  at  present  carried  away 
by  the  glamor  of  temporary  supremacy  over 
a  demoralized  Russia,  are  behind  the  gov- 
ernment in  its  present  unrepentant  mood, 
it  is  merely  an  indication  that  the  struggle 
for  the  moral  issue  must  continue  until  it  is 
recognized  by  the  German  people  as  an  ob- 
stacle to  peace  that  can  be  removed  in  only 
one  way.  But  we,  too,  must  be  on  our 
guard  lest  those  acting  for  us  should  not 
fully  realize  that  the  moral  issue  also  de- 
mands that  never  again  shall  it  be  left  in 
the  hands  of  a  few,  in  any  country,  to  bring 
on  a  war  or  to  dictate  the  terms  of  peace. 
Peoples  who  pay  the  price  of  war  must  con- 
trol the  spirit  hovering  over  peace  negotia- 
tions. They  can  do  so  only  by  giving  voice 
to  their  hopes  and  aspirations  in  so  emphatic 
a  manner  that  it  will  be  heeded  by  their 
representatives.  If  through  the  crystalliza- 
tion of  public  opinion  the  resolves  of  the 
peoples  in  all  belligerent  lands  shall  swell 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

into  a  mighty  chorus  in  the  demand  for  a 
just  peace,  and,  so  far  as  it  lies  within  human 
possibility,  for  a  permanent  peace,  we  may 
feel  reasonably  certain  that  such  a  peace, 
and  none  other,  will  be  forthcoming.  The 
details  can  then  be  safely  left,  as  indeed 
they  must  be  left,  to  the  experienced  states- 
men who  will  be  chosen  to  act  for  the  people. 
It  is  in  the  hope  of  making  a  modest  contri- 
bution towards  the  clarification  of  public 
opinion  and  of  stimulating  others  who  have 
studied  the  situation  to  do  the  same,  that  I 
venture  on  a  general  discussion  of  the  prob- 
lem of  peace  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
moral  issue  involved  in  the  war. 

II 

First,  then,  what  do  we  mean  by  peace? 
Surely  more  than  a  temporary  and  patch- 
work settlement  of  the  issues  between  the 
European  nations  that  existed  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war,  and  which  led  to  the  strug- 
gle that  appeared  to  be  at  first  merely  a  con- 
99 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

flict  for  supremacy  among  rival  contestants. 
Peace  congresses  have  hitherto  been  founded 
on  the  principle  of  trying  to  patch  up  an 
agreement  between  contending  nations,  in- 
stead of  probing  for  the  causes  of  a  war,  and 
of  regulating  the  relations  between  nations 
according  to  ascertained  principles.  A 
peace  congress  after  a  war  has  generally 
meant  merely  a  shuffling  of  cards  with  a  re- 
distribution in  such  a  manner  that  one  or 
two  of  the  nations  are  given  the  trumps,  and 
the  rest  have  to  be  content  with  what  they 
get.  One  is  tempted  to  say  that  one  reason 
why  there  have  been  so  many  wars  in  the 
nineteenth  century  is  because  there  have 
been  so  many  peace  congresses.  There  were 
three  notable  ones,  besides  many  minor  con- 
ferences— Vienna  in  1815,  Paris  in  1856, 
and  Berlin  in  1878.  Each  one  of  these  con- 
gresses settled  European  affairs  so  clumsily 
as  to  lead  to  the  preparation  for  the  next 
war.  Immanuel  Kant,  in  a  noble  and 
notable  essay  setting  forth  some  ideas  on 

100 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

perpetual  peace,  points  out  that  a  peace 
treaty  should  never  contain  the  seeds  of  an- 
other war.  Peace  treaties  hitherto  have  al- 
ways contained  such  seeds.  Because  of  this 
fact,  peace  congresses  have  in  the  past  not 
established  peace,  but  merely  an  armistice, 
of  shorter  or  longer  duration.  The  first 
step  in  the  direction  of  real  peace  in  our 
days  was  taken  in  1889,  when  the  Hague 
conference  was  convened.  That  was  a  gen- 
uine peace  congress,  as  was  also  its  suc- 
cessor in  1907,  for  these  conferences  devoted 
themselves  to  the  consideration  of  the  causes 
that  produce  wars.  The  first  duty  of  a 
peace  congress  is  to  consider  war,  not  peace 
— to  interpret  the  deeper  meaning  of  a  war 
that  has  broken  out,  to  consider  the  condi- 
tions that  make  for  war,  and  to  ascertain 
the  principles  that  should  guide  nations  in 
the  settlement  of  a  war  after  the  fighting  is 
over.  Such  were  the  functions  that  the  two 
Hague  Conferences  took  upon  themselves. 

The   circumstance   that  these   conferences 
101 


■ 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

were  unable  to  prevent  the  war  of  1914  does 
not  spell  failure,  but  merely  an  indication 
that  the  nations  of  the  world  were  not  yet 
prepared  for  peace.  The  great  powers  rep- 
resented in  these  conferences  were  at  the 
time  filled  with  thoughts  of  war,  and  some 
of  them  with  preparations  for  war,  and 
under  the  influence  of  the  historical  tradi- 
tion that  dominated  European  politics  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  1914,  war,  active 
or  in  embryo,  was  a  normal  condition — peace 
the  abnormal.  How  could  it  be  otherwise, 
with  wars  following  in  the  wake  of  one  an- 
other in  constant  and  rapid  succession. 
There  is  scarcely  a  period  of  five  years  in 
the  nineteenth  century  in  which  we  do  not 
find  war  somewhere  in  Europe,  or  in  Asia, 
or  in  Africa,  or  in  this  country.  As  long 
as  nations  think  first  of  war  and  only  in  a 
secondary  degree  of  peace,  as  long  as  na- 
tions are  prepared  or  preparing  for  war — 
and  that  may  be  necessary  even  after  this 
war — how  is  it  possible  for  peace  to  prevail  ? 

102 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

Let  us  face  the  question  frankly,  for  next 
to  an  inconclusive  peace,  the  worst  evil  that 
can  befall  us  is  to  have  a  muddled  idea  of 
peace.  By  peace,  therefore,  we  should  mean 
the  establishment  of  conditions  that  make 
for  peace.  The  Hague  Conferences  took 
an  important  step  in  this  direction  by  the 
assertion  of  the  principle  of  tribunals  of 
arbitration  for  the  settlement  of  difficulties 
between  nations.  If  these  conferences  had 
done  nothing  more  they  would  have  amply 
justified  their  existence,  for  this  step  marks 
a  beginning  of  the  determination  of  the  con- 
ditions under  which  peace  is  possible.  Such 
tribunals  had  been  convened  from  time  to 
time  before  The  Hague  conferences,  but 
the  principle  had  not  hitherto  been  accepted 
as  an  integral  part  of  modern  international 
politics.  The  second  conference  also  pro- 
posed to  discuss  the  question  of  disarma- 
ment, but  the  opposition  of  Germany  pre- 
vented this  desirable  aim  from  being  carried 
out.    At  the  Third  Conference,  it  is  safe  to 

103 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

predict,  the  question  of  disarmament  will  be 
the  primary  one — as  it  is  equally  safe  to 
prophesy  that,  assuming  the  triumph  of  the 
moral  issue  involved  in  the  war,  no  nation 
will  dare  to  oppose  a  discussion  of  so  funda- 
mental a  problem,  least  of  all  Germany, 
which,  chastened  by  her  present  moral  iso- 
lation— which  must  be  stinging  to  the  pride 
of  a  nation — will  realize,  perhaps  more 
clearly  than  any  other,  that  her  own  salva- 
tion and  future  progress  will  depend  upon 
the  removal  of  the  most  serious  obstacle  to 
peace,  the  existence  of  a  large  and  powerful 
military  machine,  so  burdensome  to  a  people 
and  fraught  with  such  danger  because  the 
machine  is  a  symbol  of  power  and  of  noth- 
ing else.  To  be  sure,  with  a  democratic  form 
of  government  established  in  all  countries, 
resting  upon  the  principle  of  government 
through  the  will  of  the  people,  the  danger 
of  militarism  arising  from  the  existence  of 
large  armies  will  be  diminished.  Yet  it  is 
conceivable  that  even  free  countries  may  be 

104 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

tempted  by  false  leaders  towards  calling  in 
power  as  an  aid  to  carrying  out  national 
policies.  Even  republics  are  not  free  from 
this  danger,  for  the  lure  of  conquest  may  be 
dangled  in  a  most  attractive  form  before  the 
eyes  of  a  people.  Power  creates  the  tempta- 
tion to  use  power.  The  existence  of  a  large 
military  class  in  a  population  tends  to  keep 
alive  the  spirit  of  war,  and  the  spirit  of  war 
is  only  a  few  degrees  removed  from  the  mili- 
taristic spirit.  A  plan  of  disarmament,  care- 
fully worked  out  and  carried  out  gradually, 
is  therefore  a  logical  step  towards  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  genuine  peace.  Disarmament 
i^  the  corollary  to  the  recognition  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  tribunals  of  arbitration. 

A  third  fundamental  principle  for  the 
establishment  of  a  genuine  peace  involves 
the  organization  of  some  kind  of  a  league  of 
nations  which  will  have  the  authority  also 
to  carry  out  its  decrees  for  safeguarding  the 
world  against  a  mad  outbreak  on  the  part  of 
any  single  nation,  or  of  a  combination  of 

105 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

nations  attempting  to  act  independently  of 
the  proposed  league.  Opinions  are  nat- 
urally divided,  and  considerably  so,  as  to 
the  form  which  such  a  league  shall  take. 
Many  strong  voices  have  been  raised  in 
favor  of  an  international  parliament  (under 
whatever  name),  to  meet  regularly  and  to 
which  representatives  should  be  elected 
either  proportionate  to  the  population  of 
nations,  or  in  equal  numbers  from  all  the 
nations  represented.  Such  an  international 
body,  representative  of  public  opinion,  and 
not  the  kind  of  opinion  which  emanates  from 
diplomatic  groups,  could  devote  itself  to 
the  consideration  of  international  problems 
as  they  arise,  to  the  regulation  of  interna- 
tional commerce ;  to  the  safeguarding  of  the 
interests  of  weaker  nations  against  en- 
croachments of  powerful  groups ;  to  remov- 
ing causes  of  irritation  to  any  nation,  and 
to  forestalling,  so  far  as  humanly  possible, 
crises  that  may  lead  to  war.  Such  a  body 
would  also  take  over  the  important  func- 

106 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

tions  of  the  Hague  conferences  in  regulat- 
ing the  methods  of  warfare  for  the  protec- 
tion of  neutrals  and  noncombatants,  and  for 
keeping  a  conflict  which  might  arise  within 
such  limits  as  to  prevent  the  danger  of  the 
collapse  of  civilization,  so  seriously  threat- 
ened by  the  present  war. 

With  power  to  carry  out  its  regulations, 
such  a  parliament  would  obviously  be  a  body 
primarily  devoted  to  studying  the  causes 
of  war.  Its  functions  will  necessarily  lead 
to  such  a  study.  It  will  be  able,  by  virtue 
of  accumulating  experience,  shared  in  by 
all  the  nations  represented,  to  detect  dan- 
gers in  time  to  prevent  their  growing  beyond 
control. 

Above  all,  an  international  representative 
body  will  be  a  powerful  incentive  in  pro- 
moting the  spirit  of  internationalism,  in 
order  to  counteract  the  overemphasis  on 
nationalism  which  we  have  seen  to  have  been 
one  of  the  causes  that  has  led  to  the  moral 
downfall  of  so  many  of  the  intellectual 

107 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

leaders  of  Germany  during  the  present  war. 
For  one  of  the  most  discouraging  signs  of 
the  present  outlook  is  the  frank  opposition 
among  German  intellectuals  to  anything 
that  smacks  of  internationalism.  Ex- Am- 
bassador David  Jayne  Hill,  in  his  valuable 
work  on  the  "  Rebuilding  of  Europe," 
touches  upon  this  point  in  connection  with 
a  quotation  from  the  leading  historian  of 
Germany,2  who  goes  so  far  as  to  advocate 
the  abandonment  of  all  international  en- 
deavors as  an  idle  pursuit,  a  political  will- 
o'-the-wisp;  and  why?  Because  Germany, 
he  says,  is  always  the  loser  in  such  efforts, 
obliged,  as  she  is,  to  yield  something  to  the 
interests  of  the  other  nations.  The  distin- 
guished professor  does  not  seem  to  be  aware 
that  he  thus  involuntarily  reveals  the  in- 
herent defect  in  Germany's  national  policy 
by  the  admission  that  it  is  incompatible  with 
international  considerations.  How  can  a 
nation  shape  its  policy  on  an  assumption 

2  Page  138. 

108 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

that  it  represents  an  isolated  unit — more 
particularly  in  these  days  of  international 
commingling  of  interests?  That  point  of 
view,  with  its  exaggerated  emphasis  on  na- 
tionalism, arises  logically  in  a  country  which 
depends,  not  upon  the  inherent  qualities  of 
its  policy,  but  upon  military  power  or  the 
threat  of  force  to  carry  out  its  ends.  A 
nation  that  is  under  the  delusion  that  it  is 
proper  to  ignore  international  points  of  view 
will  naturally  be  led  to  ride  roughshod  over 
the  interests  of  other  countries.  Such  a 
nation  commits  the  cardinal  sin  which  will 
rebound  on  the  head  of  the  one  who  is  guilty 
of  it.  Brandes,  in  the  prophetic  passage 
which  I  have  chosen  as  the  motto  of  this 
essay,  properly  holds  up  as  the  contrast  to 
the  international  spirit  prevalent  in  the 
rest  of  the  world,  the  position  of  Germany 
as  a  center  of  conservatism  in  a  progressive 
Europe.  The  manifestation  of  the  inter- 
national spirit  in  science,  in  art,  in  labor 
unions,  in  business  organizations,  in  human- 

109 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

itarian  endeavors,  is  one  of  the  striking 
symptoms  of  the  age  in  which  we  live.  The 
spread  of  this  spirit  may  well  be  regarded 
as  the  hope  of  the  future.  Internationalism 
will  form  the  very  basis  of  progress  in  the 
new  world  which  will  arise  out  of  the  crisis 
through  which  we  are  now  passing.  An  in- 
ternational body,  whether  a  league  or  parlia- 
ment of  nations,  thus  looms  up  as  a  further 
logical  expression  to  be  given  to  the  com- 
plete triumph  of  the  moral  issue. 

Ill 

As  against  this  larger  scheme  of  a  parlia- 
ment or  international  body,  sitting  at  regu- 
lar periods,  a  more  restricted  scheme  of  a 
league  of  nations,  primarily  and  chiefly  to 
enforce  peace,  commends  itself  to  many  wise 
minds  as  more  in  keeping  with  the  present 
still  undeveloped  stage  reached  in  the  mani- 
festation of  the  international  spirit.  It  is 
held  that  we  have  not  yet  advanced  to  the 
point  when  nations  will  be  willing  to  sink 
no 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

their  national  interests  to  the  extent  that 
would  be  required  by  the  establishment  of 
a  genuine  and  effective  international  parlia- 
ment. The  blending  of  interests,  it  is 
argued,  may  lead,  at  the  present  juncture 
of  affairs,  to  the  weakening  of  some  nations 
and  redound  to  the  unequal  advantage  of 
others.  So  distinguished  an  authority  as 
Dr.  Hill,  whose  important  investigations 
in  the  history  of  diplomacy,  supplemented 
by  his  large  practical  experience,  give  to 
his  utterances  special  weight,  is  among  those 
who  question  the  advisability  of  planning  at 
present  for  an  international  body  with  legis- 
lative functions  and  powers.  Between  the 
difficulties  involved  in  voluntary  adhesion 
to  the  decrees  of  such  a  body  on  the  one 
hand,  and  compulsory  acceptance  on  the 
other,  an  international  parliament  would 
find  it  difficult  to  steer  a  course  that  could 
lead  to  positive  results.  It  is  urged  that 
such  a  parliament  might  be  inclined  to  en- 
croach on  the  internal  affairs  of  a  country, 
ill 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

or  on  what  a  country  would  regard  as  such, 
and  at  the  present  stage  of  sharp  differen- 
tiation between  nationalistic  characteristics, 
involving  opposite  ways  of  looking  at  inter- 
national problems,  the  most  that  could  be 
hoped  for  would  be  the  creation  of  a  nucleus 
"  for  the  ultimate  union  of  all  responsi- 
ble and  socially  inclined  nations.'' 3 

There  is  much  force  in  such  contentions, 
which  have  been  advanced  in  various  forms 
by  others;  but  the  objection  need  not  carry 
us  further  than  to  suggest  that  the  scope 
of  an  international  parliament  must  needs 
be  at  first  restricted  to  a  consideration  of  the 
most  necessary  measures  needed  to  establish 
a  genuine  peace.  The  objection,  on  the  other 
hand,  against  a  mere  league  of  nations  to 
enforce  peace  is  obviously  this — that  it 
places  too  exclusive  a  regard  upon  the  com- 
bination of  the  nations  of  the  world  against 
a  disturber  of  the  world's  tranquillity  as  the 

3  "  Rebuilding  of  Europe,"  page  187. 
112 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

one  means  of  securing  peace.  That  view 
naturally  comes  to  our  minds  through  the 
act  of  Germany  in  bringing  on  the  war,  when 
she  might  have  prevented  it  by  accepting 
Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  a  confer- 
ence at  the  time  of  the  Austro- Serbian 
crisis.  But  must  it  be  assumed  that  this 
condition  will  necessarily  be  the  greatest 
source  of  danger  in  the  future?  If  I  am 
correct  in  the  analysis  of  the  war  as  in- 
volving primarily  a  moral  issue,  does  not  this 
issue  rather  point  to  an  entirely  different 
source  of  danger,  to  wit,  the  use  of  power 
to  carry  out  national  aims?  If  this  be  so, 
the  avoidance  of  the  danger  for  the  future 
should  go  to  the  root  of  the  evil — the  con- 
trol of  an  entire  people  by  a  military  group. 
If  the  war  ends,  as  we  feel  that  it  must  end, 
by  the  triumph  of  the  moral  issue,  the  mental 
frame  of  the  world  will  not  be  such  as  to 
suggest  that  the  primary  end  of  an  inter- 
national league  is  the  protection  against  a 
possible  criminal  among  the  nations,  but 

8  113 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

rather  to  the  furtherance  of  international 
relations  as  the  greatest  safeguard  against 
the  creation  of  such  a  criminal. 

If  the  war,  however,  should  close  without 
the  overthrow  of  militarism  in  Germany, 
then,  to  be  sure,  a  league  of  nations,  formed 
to  enforce  peace,  will  be  the  logical  step. 
In  such  a  league  an  unrepentant  and  un- 
chastened  Germany  would  have  no  place, 
for  the  world  would  still  be  in  danger  of  an 
alliance  between  Germany  and  some  other 
power  or  powers,  bent  on  imperialistic 
ambitions  of  domination  and  conquest.  A 
league  to  enforce  peace  may  well  be  needed 
at  the  close  of  the  war,  but  it  is  not  the  kind 
of  an  international  body  to  which  we  should 
look  forward  as  an  ideal.  Such  a  league 
may  represent  an  intermediate  measure  de- 
manded by  conditions  that  may  exist  on  the 
termination  of  the  conflict;  but  the  efforts 
of  the  world  ought  to  be  directed  towards 
a  combination  of  nations  which  does  not  rest 
upon  suspicion,  but  which  assumes  as  its 

114 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

basis  the  desire  of  nations  to  determine  the 
principles  upon  which  the  peace  of  the  world 
can  be  erected. 

IV 

More  serious  are  the  objections  of  those 
who  in  a  spirit  of  discouragement,  which  is 
not  unnatural  in  the  light  of  the  present  de- 
pressing experience,  feel  that  international 
guarantees  and  decisions  are  of  no  value 
unless  backed  by  the  force  to  carry  them 
out.  The  conclusion  is  drawn  from  the  un- 
holy alliance  in  Germany  between  power 
and  national  policies,  that  the  only  safe- 
guard of  the  world  is  to  oppose  power  by 
power.  Ambitious  nations  or  even  nations 
without  sinister  designs  of  conquest,  but 
which  feel  themselves  hemmed  in,  or  which 
scent  the  hostility  of  sister  nations  against 
their  national  expansion,  will  not  be  re- 
strained by  treaties  or  agreements,  entered 
into  by  a  former  generation,  which,  it  will 
be  claimed,  did  not  foresee  the  developments 

115 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

of  the  future.  Nations  will  wish  to  set  aside 
agreements  when  such  agreements  are  irk- 
some. If  relief  cannot  be  found  through 
channels  of  amicable  diplomacy,  the  en- 
deavor will  be  made  to  obtain  it  at  the  point 
of  the  sword.  The  world,  it  is  held,  must  be 
prepared  to  meet  such  crises  which  may  at 
any  moment  arise,  by  the  threat  of  larger 
power  against  an  aggressive  or  unconscien- 
tious member  of  the  society  of  nations.  This 
means  that  all  nations,  and  especially  the 
stronger  ones,  must  be  ready,  through  large 
standing  armies,  to  assert  their  rights  and 
the  rights  of  weaker  nations  against  unjust 
demands.  Nations,  it  is  held,  are  after  all 
aggregates  of  power.  The  idealist  may 
picture  them  otherwise,  but  the  facts  are 
against  him.  The  league  to  enforce  peace 
is  of  no  value  unless  it  is  in  a  military  sense 
strong  enough  to  frighten  the  strongest  pos- 
sible offender  into  submission.  Even  such 
submission  may  not  hinder  the  offender  from 
making  another  attempt  at  a  more  favorable 

116 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

moment,  or  when  he  thinks  himself  strong 
enough  to  take  the  gambler's  chance  against 
the  whole  field. 

Now  the  answer  to  the  contentions  of  the 
realist  is  assuredly  not  to  paint  in  glowing 
colors  a  Utopian  picture  of  a  purely  imag- 
inary millennium,  even  though  the  idealist 
might  reply  that  many  a  dream,  at  one  time 
considered  purely  fanciful,  has  been  realized, 
even  within  the  domain  of  international  poli- 
tics. Unless  indeed  we  accept  the  biological 
argument  for  war,  and  further  maintain  in 
a  frank,  though  pessimistic,  spirit  that  war 
is  man's  natural  element,  and  regard  wars 
between  nations  as  the  means  by  which, 
under  the  wastefulness  of  nature,  the  desti- 
nies of  peoples  are  worked  out  and  progress, 
so  far  as  one  can  speak  of  progress,  is  at- 
tained— unless  we  take  this  position,  there 
is  no  more  inherent  reason  why  war  should 
not  be  stamped  out  than  why  poverty  should 
not  be  stamped  out,  or  why  eventually  all 
contagious  diseases  should  not  be  conquered 
117 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

by  the  growth  of  medical  science.  The  stu- 
dent who  looks  to  the  future  does  not  delude 
himself  by  the  idle  fancy  that  if  war  is  abol- 
ished the  millennium  will  have  been  attained. 
The  Golden  Age  will  still  be  far  off,  for 
war  is  only  one  of  many  evils,  and  perhaps 
not  the  worst.  The  objection  to  the  biolog- 
ical argument  has  already  been  set  forth, 
that  it  ignores  the  inherent  opposition  be- 
tween civilization  and  the  display  of  power 
which  is  Nature's  way.  The  aim  of  civiliza- 
tion is  that  of  the  "  Superman,"  to  overcome 
power  by  the  introduction  of  other  factors 
in  the  evolution  of  man  that  are  distinct 
from  power — factors  that  make  for  the 
triumph  over  power.  If  we  accept  this 
premise,  the  only  ground  for  an  attitude  of 
despair  regarding  efforts  at  establishing  a 
genuine  peace  as  hopeless,  would  be  to 
assume  that  the  causes  of  war  cannot  be  re- 
moved, and  this  is  obviously  gratuitous. 

In  the  present  instance,  always  assuming 
that  my  analysis  of  the  situation  is  correct, 

118 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

the  cause  is  to  be  found  in  the  combination 
of  power  with  national  ambitions.  That 
cause,  we  have  seen,  was  also  active  at  vari- 
ous crises  in  the  history  of  the  world,  when 
the  world  found  it  necessary  to  unite  in  re- 
moving a  menace  presented  by  some  imper- 
ialistic nation  or  group.  It  has  also  been 
shown  that  the  source  of  greatest  danger  lies 
in  the  concentration  of  power  within  a  group 
holding  an  entire  nation  in  control,  and  that 
the  danger  is  far  less  when  power  is  con- 
ferred on  a  group  by  the  freely  expressed 
will  of  the  people.  The  moral  issue  in  the 
present  war  arises  from  the  circumstance 
that  the  power  in  Germany  is  wielded  by  a 
group  that  does  not  receive  its  mandate  from 
the  people,  but  which  has  inherited  its  posi- 
tion from  an  autocratic  form  of  government, 
that  has  never  been  abolished  but  only  modi- 
fied to  some  degree  under  pressure  exerted 
by  growing  popular  opposition  to  it.  Con- 
cessions have  been  wrung  from  autocracy, 
but  the  principle  of  autocracy  has  been 

119 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

maintained,  though  there  are  signs  of  its  tot- 
tering. The  moral  issue  which  involves  as 
the  condition  of  its  triumph  the  disruption 
of  the  alliance  between  national  policies  and 
military  power  also  points,  as  a  necessary 
condition  before  peace  can  be  established  on 
the  basis  of  the  principles  underlying  peace, 
to  the  overthrow  of  the  present  system  of 
government  of  Germany,  which  shapes  pub- 
lic opinion  in  ways  that  are  dark  and  devious, 
instead  of  being  governed  by  the  free  ex- 
pression of  the  popular  will.  The  system 
corrupts  public  opinion,  spreads  an  insidious 
poison  that  affects  the  intellectual  classes 
and  converts  them  into  advocates  of  the 
status  quo,  instead  of  exercising  their  proper 
function  to  point  the  way  out  of  the  status 
quo.  The  system  creates  reactionaries,  for 
the  reactionary  is  the  one  who  refuses  to  look 
to  the  future,  whose  face  is  turned  in  the 
wrong  direction.  He  becomes  an  advocate 
of  the  pernicious  principle  of  regarding  what 
is  as  right,  merely  because  it  is.  Hence,  to 
120 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

quote  Brandes  again,  Germany  logically  be- 
comes the  center  of  conservatism  in  a  pro- 
gressive Europe. 

Elsewhere4  I  have  enlarged  upon  the 
necessity  of  all  nations  being  organized  on 
the  same  general  basis  of  popular  govern- 
ment, which  does  not  mean  a  similarity  of 
methods  of  government,  but  government  on 
the  fundamental  principle  that  the  authority 
of  government  rests  with  the  people,  and 
that  government  is  an  expression  of  the  will 
of  the  people.  That  is  what  Kant,  in  his 
still  valuable  essay  on  "  Perpetual  Peace,"  B 
defines  as  the  democratic  "  form  "  of  gov- 
ernment, towards  which  he  felt  after  the 
French  Revolution  that  the  world  was  mov- 
ing. The  moral  issue  in  the  present  con- 
flict, we  have  seen,  arises  directly  out  of  the 

4  See  "  The  War  and  the  Bagdad  Railway,"  page 
137  et  seq. 

5  Republished  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  in  con- 
venient form,  both  in  England  (London,  1915)  and 
by  the  American  Peace  Society  in  this  country. 

121 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

form  or  system  of  government  in  Germany, 
which  is  precisely  the  opposite  of  democratic. 
Given  an  ambitious  ruler,  under  a  non-dem- 
ocratic form  of  government,  abetted  by  a 
group  which  like  their  chief  is  concerned  with 
retaining  its  control  over  the  people,  and 
you  obtain,  as  a  logical  sequence,  the  com- 
bination of  power  with  national  policy — 
power  as  the  means  of  carrying  out  these 
policies.  There  can  be  no  safeguarding  of 
peace  under  such  conditions.  Danger  lurks 
in  every  change  in  the  political  kaleidoscope, 
a  danger  which  is!  all  the  greater  for  being 
hidden,  until  it  is  too  late  to  avert  the  catas- 
trophe. Political  intrigues,  secret  diplo- 
macy, the  spy  system,  insidious  propaganda, 
all  arise  as  a  logical  outgrowth  of  a  govern- 
ment carried  on  under  a  non-democratic 
form.  If  among  some  European  nations 
that  have  passed  on  to  the  democratic  form, 
we  still  find  some  of  the  methods  of  the  older 
period  followed  to  a  certain  extent,  it  is 
due  in  part  to  the  principle  of  survivals — 
122 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

and  old  countries  cannot  rapidly  detach 
themselves  from  traditional  associations — 
and  in  part  to  the  necessity  of  European 
nations  to  counteract  the  sinister  efforts  of 
governments  that  still  stand  on  the  old  non- 
democratic  basis,  and  in  which,  therefore, 
the  old  methods  are  in  full  swing,  constitute 
in  fact  the  only  methods,  because  they  go 
hand  in  hand  with  an  open  or  thinly  disguised 
autocratic  form  of  government.  It  is  ob- 
vious that  there  can  be  no  lasting  peace  if 
at  the  end  of  the  war  Germany  still  main- 
tains its  present  system.  If  by  any  chance 
the  war  should  close  with  the  military  party 
still  in  control,  and  with  the  Reichstag  still 
a  mere  debating  society,  as  it  has  been  called, 
without  being  recognized  as  a  responsible 
source  of  the  government,  the  war  for  the 
moral  issue  will  have  to  go  on,  and  assuredly 
will  go  on,  even  though  a  truce  be  declared. 
Without  the  triumph  of  the  moral  issue,  it 
is  inconceivable  that  a  policy  of  disarma- 
ment can  be  inaugurated  by  any  conference 

123 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

of  nations.  Large  armies  would  have  to 
be  maintained  in  all  countries.  Tribunals 
of  arbitration  will  be  totally  insufficient  to 
prevent  uprisings,  and  a  league  of  nations 
will  necessarily  be  limited  to  a  league 
of  defense  against  the  danger  of  another 
attempt  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  force 
her  policies. 

We  are  thus  ever  brought  back,  in  con- 
sidering the  problem  of  peace,  as  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  war,  to  the  moral  issue.  Hav- 
ing regard,  therefore,  to  the  establishment 
of  conditions  that  may  make  for  enduring 
peace,  we  may  now  set  down  as  the  primary 
one  the  necessity  of  the  same  general  basis 
of  a  democratic  form  of  government  for  all 
nations.  Such  a  form  is  the  only  one  con- 
sistent with  the  spirit  of  the  age  and  with 
the  stage  of  political  development,  reached 
in  the  course  of  a  century  and  more  after 
the  principle  of  popular  government  was 
first  proclaimed  in  definite  terms  by  the 
American  Declaration  of  Independence. 

124 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

If  the  German  people  are  anxious  for 
peace,  as  they  are  said  to  be,  they  have  it  in 
their  hands  to  bring  it  about,  by  forcing  the 
democratic  issue  in  their  own  country.  No 
enduring  peace  is  possible  with  the  present 
group  in  control  of  Germany,  because  no 
guarantees  can  be  accepted  from  a  govern- 
ment that  has  shown  itself  callous  to  agree- 
ments, and  that  gives  no  indication  of  any 
change  of  mind.  The  callousness  and  un- 
repentant frame  of  mind  are  the  direct  out- 
growth of  that  system  under  which  the  pres- 
ent government  in  Germany  works.  No 
change  is,  therefore,  to  be  expected  until 
the  system  is  overthrown  to  make  way  for 
a  government  which  is  by  the  people  and  in 
control  of  the  people. 

Once  more,  lest  it  be  supposed  that  in  lay- 
ing this  persistent  emphasis  on  the  moral 
issue  in  the  war  I  am  being  misled  by  a 
foolish  dream  that  the  millennium  is  to  be 
ushered  in  through  the  universal  establish- 
ment of  the  democratic  principle  in  govern- 

125 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

ment,  let  me  say  that  no  such  illusion  is 
entertained  by  those  who  feel  that  without 
democracy  a  real  peace  is  not  possible. 
Militarism,  as  has  already  been  suggested, 
may  flourish  in  a  democratic  form  of  gov- 
ernment. Imperialism  of  an  objectionable 
shade  may  arise  as  a  menace  in  the  most  lib- 
eral of  republics,  but  the  danger  is  reduced 
to  a  minimum — and  that  is  all  that  can  be 
hoped  for — when  a  people  has  the  govern- 
ment of  a  country  in  its  control,  instead  of 
being  controlled  by  it.  The  reduction  of  the 
danger  is  as  large  a  guarantee  against  the 
occurrence  of  an  outbreak  as  is  needed  to 
form  a  basis  upon  which  a  genuine  peace 
may  be  built  up.  The  history  of  the  past 
century  in  countries  in  which  the  democratic 
principle  has  been  completely  established 
shows  that  the  militaristic  spirit  has  actually 
diminished,  and  that  imperialistic  aims  have 
been  curbed  so  as  to  avoid  the  abuse  of 
power.  The  verdict  must  be  given  that 
democracies  have,  on  the  whole,  justified 

126 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

themselves  by  keeping  national  power  within 
the  bounds  proper  to  the  natural  growth  of 
a  people. 

Here,  then,  we  have  some  of  the  main 
foundations  on  which  peace  can  be  estab- 
lished— the  organization  of  all  nations  on 
a  democratic  form  of  government  as  the 
primary  condition,  and  then  tribunals  of 
arbitration,  disarmament,  and  an  assembly 
of  nations  in  the  form  of  a  league  or  parlia- 
ment. Peace  established  on  the  recognition 
of  such  principles  would  be  a  genuine  one, 
and  not  simply  an  armistice.  The  peace 
congress  to  be  convened  upon  the  termina- 
tion of  the  conflict  which  is  guided  by  these 
principles  will  be  reasonably  safe  from  the 
danger  of  planting  the  seeds  for  future  wars, 
which  has  been  the  fundamental  weakness 
of  the  peace  congresses  of  the  past.  Even 
a  settlement  of  this  kind  will  not  necessarily 
prevent  wars  from  breaking  out,  for  new 
conditions  may  arise  which  cannot  be  fore- 
seen; but  the  danger  is  reduced  to  the  pos- 

127 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

sible  minimum,  if  the  world  is  determined  to 
direct  its  efforts  primarily  towards  the  re- 
moval of  the  causes  that  bring  on  a  bloody 
conflict. 

With  peace  established  on  the  application 
of  the  fundamental  principles  that  underlie 
peace,  the  conference,  which  should  be  a 
popular  body,  consisting  of  representatives 
of  all  classes  of  the  people,  and  not  of  diplo- 
mats representing  governments,  will  be 
ready  to  take  up  the  issues  that  confronted 
Europe  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  1914. 
To  reach  a  settlement  of  problems,  some  of 
which  represent  a  legacy  of  distant  ages,  will 
be  a  difficult  task  that  will  test  the  calibre  of 
those  who  will  have  the  privilege  and  re- 
sponsibility of  acting  for  the  peoples  of  the 
world.  If  the  analysis  attempted  in  this 
discussion  to  look  both  at  the  war  and  on 
the  problems  of  peace  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  moral  issue  involved  be  accepted,  the 
people's  representatives  will  at  least  have  a 
safe  guide  to  follow  in  giving  the  first  con- 

128 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

sideration,  in  the  settlement  of  international 
problems,  to  the  wishes  and  interests  of 
the  peoples  directly  involved.  An  enduring 
peace  must  be  based  on  the  rights  of  a  peo- 
ple to  determine  its  destiny,  instead  of  hav- 
ing its  liberties  bandied  about  as  was  done 
by  previous  peace  conferences,  and  which 
led  to  new  difficulties  and  further  conflicts. 

V 

As  for  autocracy,  linked  in  the  present 
moral  issue  to  the  spirit  of  militarism,  that 
is  doomed  to  disappear  under  all  circum- 
stances, because  entirely  out  of  keeping  with 
the  spirit  of  the  age.  It  has  passed  away  in 
Russia  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  It 
remains  as  a  mere  shadow  in  Austria-Hun- 
gary, and  has  been  shorn  of  much  of  its 
power  even  in  Germany  since  the  outbreak 
of  the  war.  Genuine  democracy,  to  be  sure, 
has  not  yet  made  its  appearance  in  Ger- 
many, and  cannot  so  long  as  the  military 
party  is  in  control.     The  concessions  that 

9  129 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

have  been  wrung  from  the  military  clique 
have  not  affected  the  theory  upon  which  the 
German  government  rests,  but  they  may  be 
regarded  as  foreshadowing  the  weakening 
of  that  theory.  The  struggle  between  the 
Reichstag  and  the  autocratic  authority  of 
the  Crown,  as  represented  before  the  war 
by  the  large  body  of  Social  Democrats,' 
assumed  a  more  threatening  aspect  in  July 
of  last  year  by  the  stand  taken  against  the 
government  by  the  Catholic  Party;  and 
though  at  present  few  signs  of  the  conflict 
are  to  be  seen  on  the  surface,  there  is,  never- 
theless, an  undercurrent  of  opposition  which 
will  again  come  to  the  surface  when  the  peo- 
ple realize  that  the  world  is  in  no  mood  to 
listen  to  peace  proposals  of  a  military  group 
serving  the  interests  of  autocracy.  The  out- 
come of  this  phase  of  the  struggle  we  must 
leave  to  developments  within  Germany,  and 
wait  as  patiently  as  we  can  for  the  moment 
when  the  popular  will  will  be  strong  enough 
to  assert  itself  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead  to 

130 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

the  complete  abandonment  of  the  theory  of 
autocracy. 

Much  more  serious  will  be  the  struggle 
for  the  overthrow  of  militarism,  and  mili- 
tarism is  a  greater  danger  than  autocracy, 
for  without  the  support  of  a  military  system 
autocracy  cannot  maintain  itself.  The  at- 
tack on  militarism,  which  during  these  try- 
ing three  years  and  more  has  been  going  on 
steadily  on  the  Western  front,  with  the  daily 
sacrifice  of  precious  lives — the  very  flower 
of  the  nations — needs  to  be  supplemented 
by  attacks  on  the  inside.  It  is  being  so  sup- 
plemented, for  despite  the  apparent  unity, 
under  the  flush  of  temporary  Isuperiority 
over  a  disorganized  foe,  there  are  many  indi- 
cations that  the  moral  issue  is  understood 
by  the  liberal  elements  in  Germany,  who 
even  at  the  present  juncture  are  raising  their 
warning  signals.  The  struggle  may  be  long, 
and  it  may  need  a  damaging  blow  to  the 
military  prestige  of  Germany,  before  the 
conviction  will  be  brought  home  to  the  Ger- 

131 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

man  people  that  their  country  can  extricate 
itself  out  of  the  position  in  which  she  has 
been  placed  by  the  alliance  of  power  with 
the  national  ambitions,  only  through  the 
creation  of  a  new  idea  of  the  State  as  the 
collective  will  of  the  people.  A  new  po- 
litical education  of  the  people  of  Germany 
must  come  about  as  the  result  of  this  war. 
That  new  education  will  represent  the 
triumph  of  the  moral  issue.  A  chastened 
Germany  will  mean  a  liberalized  and  democ- 
ratized Germany,  free  from  the  evils  that 
flow  from  the  present  system.  It  is  only 
such  a  Germany  that  will  be  able  to  resume 
her  place  in  the  concert  of  nations.  The 
moral  issue  may  be  said  to  be  approaching 
a  crisis,  symbolized  on  the  one  hand  by  the 
firm  resolve  of  the  civilized  world  to  carry 
on  the  struggle  to  a  triumphant  issue,  and 
on  the  other,  by  some  signs  of  a  sharpening 
of  the  issue  in  Germany  itself.  The  war  has 
already  lasted  beyond  the  time  that  would 
have  been  regarded  as  the  limit  of  human 

132 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

endurance.  Is  it  conceivable  that  an  entire 
people  should  be  so  blinded  for  a  much 
longer  time  by  a  false  spirit  of  patriotism  as 
to  believe,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  welfare 
of  their  country  is  bound  up  with  a  sys- 
tem of  government  that  is  entirely  beyond 
popular  control,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
this  people  should  not  see  that  in  its  last 
analysis  the  system  is  the  source  of  the  com- 
bination of  the  world  against  Germany, 
and  the  reason  for  the  moral  isolation  in 
which  Germany  finds  herself  to-day  and 
from  which  she  will  suffer  for  a  long  time 
after  the  war? 

The  recent  peace  negotiations  between 
Germany  and  Russia,  revealing  a  most 
sinister  policy  of  domination  and  conquest 
on  a  huge  scale,  are,  to  be  sure,  a  depressing 
indication  that  there  is  not  the  slightest  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  the  German  govern- 
ment to  realize  the  cardinal  sin  that  has  been 
committed  by  it  against  the  moral  con- 
science of  mankind — which  is  a  sin  also 

133 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

against  the  spirit  of  history.  For  that  gov- 
ernment is  still  steeped  in  the  delusion  that 
the  peace  of  the  world  can  be  made  by  diplo- 
mats gathered  around  a  table,  with  maps 
and  pencils,  to  draw  up  new  boundaries  on 
the  basis  of  victories  on  the  field  of  battle. 
It  is  more  than  doubtful  whether  by  such 
methods,  in  the  present  mental  frame  of  the 
world,  even  a  truce  could  be  arranged,  cer- 
tainly not  the  semblance  of  a  peace  such  as 
the  world  needs  and  is  longing  for.  The 
delusion  that  victories  on  the  field  of  battle 
can  be  made  the  basis  of  settlement  between 
nations,  again  arises  directly  out  of  the  mili- 
taristic spirit.  It  is  idle  to  hope,  therefore, 
that  as  long  as  Germany  continues  in  the 
grasp  of  a  military  system,  the  delusion  will 
be  dispelled.  Annexations,  conquests  by 
force,  domination,  represent  the  logical 
corollary  to  the  alliance  between  power  and 
national  policies,  when  wielded  by  a  group 
that  holds  a  nation  in  its  tight  grasp.  We 
are  thus,  at  every  point,  thrown  back  to  the 

134 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

single  issue  involved  in  the  struggle,  whether 
we  look  at  the  situation  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  war,  or  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  coming  peace;  it  is  a  fight  against  the 
appeal  to  power  as  a  means  of  government 
over  a  people  and  as  a  means  of  carrying 
out  national  policies.  The  two  aspects  are 
the  two  sides  of  one  and  the  same  shield. 

The  new  order  proclaims  that  a  war  is  not 
settled  either  by  victory  or  by  defeat  on  the 
field  of  battle,  but  when  the  issue  involved 
in  the  war  has  been  won  or  lost. 

The  question  might  be  raised  against  the 
contention  which  forms  both  the  starting 
point  and  the  final  goal  of  this  study  of  the 
war  and  the  problem  of  peace,  that  the 
emphasis  on  the  moral  issue  as  the  point  of 
view  from  which  both  war  and  peace  are  to 
be  considered,  is  an  over-emphasis;  that 
while  this  issue  may  represent  the  reason 
why  this  country  entered  the  war,  and  while 
its  triumph  may  be  regarded  as  the  aim  for 
which  we  are  sacrificing  lives  on  the  field 

135 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

of  battle,  the  nations  of  Europe  are  not 
ready  to  accept  this  point  of  view.  Is  not 
France,  it  may  be  asked,  fighting,  in  the 
first  place,  to  ward  off  an  attack,  and  in  the 
second,  to  regain,  if  successful,  provinces 
taken  from  her  forty  years  ago,  and  which 
she  feels  of  right  belong  to  her  ?  Is  not  Italy 
fighting  to  regain  provinces  which  she  feels 
are  her  own,  and  is  not  England  fighting 
to  retain  her  hold  on  possessions,  as  much  as 
to  carry  out  her  obligations  as  one  of  the 
guarantors  of  Belgium's  outraged  neutral- 
ity? What,  then,  becomes  of  the  moral 
issue?  Let  us  see.  France  is  fighting  for 
her  defense,  but  against  what?  Not  against 
an  enemy  whom  she  has  offended,  but 
against  one  who  is  bent  upon  further  weak- 
ening her,  because  France  stands  in  the  way 
of  Germany's  pursuit  of  her  imperialistic 
aims.  The  hostility  between  the  French 
and  the  Germans  was  gradually  passing 
away  during  the  decade  before  the  war. 
Strong  as  the  desire  of  France  still  was  to 

136 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

regain  provinces  that  had  been  wrested  from 
her  by  the  fortunes  of  war,  it  is  generally 
recognized  that  she  had  no  thought  whatso- 
ever of  precipitating  a  bloody  conflict  in 
order  to  realize  her  hopes.  The  attack  upon 
her  which  came  as  a  part  of  the  policy  of  a 
government  that  had  linked  power  with  na- 
tional ambitions,  places  France  in  the  atti- 
tude of  fighting  for  that  moral  issue  to  the 
same  extent  that  we  are  doing.  As  for  Italy, 
while  we  may  regret  that  on  her  entrance 
into  the  conflict  she  did  not  in  a  definite 
manner  make  the  moral  issue  the  basis  for 
her  participation,  instead  of  presenting  the 
spectacle  of  making  a  bargain — now  estab- 
lished by  the  publication  of  the  Secret 
Treaties6 — it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the 
recognition  of  the  menace  presented  by  Ger- 
many was  the  reason  which  led  her  to  aban- 
don the  Triple  Alliance.  Her  leaders  have 
given  voice  to  this  view,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped 

6  See  the  symposium  on  "  The  Secret  Treaties,"  in 
the  Nation  of  February  7,  1918. 

137 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

that  they  will  even  more  emphatically,  as  the 
conflict  proceeds,  set  aside  purely  national 
aspirations  and  thus  strengthen  the  forces  of 
Italy  in  the  world's  struggle  for  liberty  and 
right.  England,  finally,  has,  through  the 
utterances  of  her  leading  statesmen,  em- 
phasized again  and  again  the  singleness  of 
the  issue  that  represents  the  undercurrent  in 
this  war.  If  the  expressions  that  reach  us 
from  the  other  side  are  not  fully  as  definite 
as  the  message  voiced  on  various  occasions 
by  President  Wilson  in  statements  that 
have  already  become  historical,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  situation  is  much  more 
complicated  for  Europe  than  it  is  for  us. 
We  are  free  from  the  entanglements  of  past 
European  history.  With  nations  elbowing 
one  another,  as  is  the  case  in  Europe,  gov- 
ernments that  have  received  as  a  legacy  from 
the  past  complicated  issues  resulting  from 
the  pernicious  secret  diplomacy  that  became 
a  tradition  in  European  Chancellories,  find 
it  more  difficult  to  proclaim  the  new  order 

138 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

of  the  world,  even  when  that  order  is  recog- 
nized by  them;  but  just  because  of  the  con- 
ditions which  the  present  Europe  has  in- 
herited from  former  generations,  it  is  all  the 
more  important  for  us  to  distinguish  be- 
tween surface  indications  and  undercurrents. 
Our  voice  in  stressing  the  moral  issue  as  the 
one  which  sanctifies  the  war  and  takes  it 
completely  out  of  the  category  of  being 
waged  for  the  satisfaction  of  national  ambi- 
tions, however  much  such  ambitions  may  be 
justified  from  other  points  of  view,  is  al- 
ready having  a  profound  effect  in  clarifying 
the  European  situation.  In  fact,  the  uni- 
versality of  the  applause  which  has  greeted 
these  utterances  is  testimony  to  the  extent 
to  which  the  same  opinions  were  already  held 
in  France  and  England,  only  a  concrete 
statement  of  them  being  necessary  to  evoke 
immediate  response.  The  proclamation  of 
the  new  order  by  the  President  of  this  Re- 
public is  rapidly  becoming  the  most  potent 
factor  in  leading  to  the  complete  acceptance 

139 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

of  the  moral  issue  as  the  one  that  unifies  the 
civilized  world  in  the  present  crisis.  A  broad 
view  of  the  European  situation,  with  due 
regard  to  conditions  there  that  necessitate  a 
slower  pace,  makes  it  evident  that  what  is 
stirring  England,  France  and  Italy  at  the 
present  moment  to  a  determined  resistance 
is  the  recognition  of  the  issue  which  has 
brought  us  into  the  conflict. 

The  civilized  world  proclaims  in  chorus 
to-day,  as  did  Luther  of  old,  "  Here  we 
stand ;  we  cannot  do  otherwise  " — and  will 
not.  There  is  only  one  response  pos- 
sible to  such  a  cry,  the  triumph  of  the  issue 
by  the  overthrow  of  the  system  which  is  the 
cause  of  the  present  calamitous  condition  of 
the  world.  Nor  need  we  have  any  fear  of 
the  ultimate  outcome  if  we  but  keep  our 
eyes  fixed  on  the  one  supreme  issue.  That 
condition  is  indeed  of  major  importance. 
Such  a  concentration  involves  that  for  the 
present  all  questions  that  confronted  Eu- 
rope at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  must,  until 

140 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

the  time  for  peace  negotiations  arrives,  be 
moved  into  the  background.  Above  all,  the 
imperialistic  aims  of  any  of  the  nations  in- 
volved in  the  war  must  be  frankly  pushed 
aside,  as  a  necessary  condition  to  the  crush- 
ing of  the  militaristic  spirit  in  the  future, 
wherever  it  may  make  its  appearance.  The 
fight  for  a  moral  principle  is  weakened  by 
the  intrusion  of  selfish  interests,  however 
much  those  interests  may  be  justified  on 
political  grounds  or  on  the  grounds  of  ex- 
pediency. The  moral  issue  of  the  war  fur- 
ther demands  that  all  those  fighting  on  the 
side  of  freedom  and  liberty  must  recognize 
the  inherent  injustice  of  dividing  up  any 
part  of  the  world  among  strong  nations,  to 
the  disadvantage  of  weaker  ones,  and  in  dis- 
regard of  the  rights  and  happiness  of  the 
people  inhabiting  the  region  upon  which  a 
strong  nation  fixes  its  eyes.  Exploitation 
must  give  way  to  cooperation  in  the 
triumph  of  the  moral  issue.  Annexation 
must   yield    to    a    policy    of   resuscitating 

141 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

regions  that  through  misrule  or  through 
other  causes  have  been  allowed  to  fall  into 
decay.  That  applies  particularly  to  the 
East,  which  as  the  mother  of  civilization  and 
the  birthplace  of  the  great  religions  of  the 
world,  and  fertile  source  of  art  and  litera- 
ture, must  be  resuscitated,  not  conquered.7 
And,  lastly,  this  one  word  of  warning  for 
those  of  us  more  particularly  who  are  not 
engaged  in  the  actual  struggle,  but  who  are 
watching  it  with  anxious  hearts.  Let  us  not 
becloud  the  issue  by  harboring  the  spirit  of 
vengeance  or  by  encouraging  the  spirit  of 
hatred.  To  hate  an  entire  people  is  an  im- 
moral act — aye,  almost  a  crime;  and  when 
fighting  for  a  lofty  principle,  we  are  risking 
the  concentration  of  all  our  strength  on  the 
main  issue  by  translating  the  principle  for 
which  we  are  fighting  into  terms  of  hatred. 
For  those  who  are  in  the  field  of  action,  the 

7  See  further  on  this  aspect  of  the  situation,  the 
author's  "  The  War  and  the  Bagdad  Railway/'  p. 
140  et  9eq. 

142 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

warning  is  unnecessary,  for  when  face  to 
face  with  the  foe,  the  tragedy  of  the  situa- 
tion is  so  overwhelming  as  to  drive  away 
every  thought  except  that  of  the  horror  of 
the  struggle.  Such,  at  all  events,  is  the  testi- 
mony of  those  who  come  back  and  tell  us 
of  the  feelings  engendered  on  the  battle- 
field. In  the  moment  of  supreme  danger, 
when  about  to  kill  one  whom  one  does  not 
know,  and  in  many  cases  one  does  not  see, 
passion  may  be  an  impelling  factor,  but  not 
hate.  But  for  us  who  do  not  incur  personal 
danger,  while  our  indignation  at  wrongs 
committed  should  be  strong,  while  we  should 
condemn  the  brutalities  and  atrocities  of  the 
war  without  mercy,  while  we  should  not 
yield  in  our  determination  to  carry  the  issue 
to  a  triumphant  conclusion,  we  weaken  the 
cause  in  which  we  are  engaged  by  convert- 
ing our  just  indignation  into  hatred.  A 
moral  issue  stands  high  above  hatred.  It 
needs  no  hatred  to  inspire  those  who  believe 
in  it  with  confidence  in  its  ultimate  triumph. 

143 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE 

The  idea  of  what  is  right  and  just  makes 
its  way  by  its  inherent  force,  and  the  idea 
in  the  present  conflict  is  Ahuramazda,  the 
power  that  makes  for  good.  Hatred  is  in 
the  service  of  Ahriman,  the  power  of  evil. 
The  triumph  of  the  moral  issue  involved  in 
the  war  is  the  victory  of  Ahuramazda  over 
Ahriman,  the  overcoming  of  evil  by  the  over- 
throw of  power — the  enthronement  of  right 
as  against  might;  and  this  will  be  followed, 
as  surely  as  the  day  follows  the  night,  by  the 
dawn  of  a  new  era  of  light  and  peace  for  the 
entire  world. 


144 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  50  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY.  AND  TO  $1.00  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


£"'■■   4   [gafi 


IBM  gg 


#fr 


*3^ 


"tfr 


^-+J-r 


JUM    1    £ 


% 


j    £5?^ 


1831 


% 


LD21-100//(  7,';!:t 


VB  33850 


s 


381933 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


: 


